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I. THE PURPOSE OF THE ANNUAL REPORT
The Labor Relations Commission (the Commission) administers the
Public Employee Bargaining Law, Chapter 150E, and the "Baby Wagner Act,"
Chapter 150A of the General Laws. These laws give employees of state
and local government, and employees of private businesses which conduct
only intra-state transactions, the right to organize and bargain
collectively with their employers.
The Commission conducts elections for collective bargaining re-
presentatives, and certifies the results; holds hearings and issues
decisions on unfair, or prohibited, labor practice charges; investi-
gates strikes; and considers requests for binding arbitration.
Although the Commission has been in existence since 1937 to admin-
ister Chapter 150A, its jurisdiction was greatly expanded in 1964, 1975,
and 1973, when the legislature granted collective bargaining rights to
municipal, county and state employees respectively. (See Table 1: "How
Did Public Employees Bargaining Evolve?")
The purpose of this report is: to explain how the Commission
functions; to report important decisions issued this year; and to pro-
vide information concerning the agency's workload and productivity.
II. MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE YEAR
1 . Decisions and Orders
A list of the Commission's major Decisions and Orders of the past
year appear in Appendix A.
2 . New Representation Petition Procedures
New procedures for handling representation petitions have reduced
the time from the day a petition is filed, to the day an election is
held by one half.
3 . Major Elections
Appendix B contains a list of the Commission's major elections in
the past fiscal year.
4 . Increased Productivity
The number of Decisions issued this year has increased 25 percent.
This indicates that the productivity of the Commission has increased,
and that cases are being disposed of more rapidly.
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III. STRUCTURE OF THE COMMISSION
The Commission is composed of three members, appointed by the
Governor, who serve five year terms. One commissioner is designated
to act as Chairman. The Commission has the authority to make, amend
and rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the provisions of the law.
The Executive Secretary supervises employees under the direction
of the Commission; prepares agendas for executive session; keeps the
Commission informed of all matters pending; and maintains a permanent
record of the disposition of any matter discussed and/or voted upon at
the executive session. There is also an assistant executive secretary.
A staff of attorneys acts as agents of the Commission to: prosecute
any inquiry necessary to the performance of its functions; appear for
and represent the Commission in any case in court; and to conduct
hearings
.
Labor Relations Examiners also act as Commission agents to conduct
investigations and elections.
The head clerk attends to bookkeeping and administrative matters.
Stenographers report formal hearings. Secretaries type decisions,
prepare election material, send out notices and perform other clerical
and administrative tasks. (See Table 2.)
1 . Commissioners and Executive Secretary
James S. Cooper has served as Chairman since October 1975. Pre-
viously he was an attorney for the Boston law firm of Holtz and
Drachman, the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, and the
New Jersey Division of Civil Rights. He is a graduate of Rutgers
University Law School, where he served as a clinical instructor the
year following his graduation.
Garry J. Wooters was appointed to the Commission in November
1976, to replace Henry C. Alarie, who retired. Commissioner Wooters
has previously served as counsel to the Commission, as a field attorney
for the National Labor Relations Board, and as counsel to the
National Association of Government Employees. He is a graduate of
Boston University Law School.
Joan G. Dolan was appointed as a Commissioner on July 18, 1977.
She replaced Madeline H. Miceli, who retired in January. Dolan was
previously an attorney for the Massachusetts Teachers Association,
and is a graduate of Northeastern University Law School.
Ann Da Dalt assumed her duties as Executive Secretary when
Alfonzo D'Apuzzo retired. She had previously served as assistant
executive secretary.
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2. The Staff
Rita Alberti
,
secretary, has returned to the Commission, where
she previously worked for over 20 years, after a year at the Department
of Elder Affairs ... Bill Blanning
,
public information officer, joined
the Commission in February. He graduated from Yale in 1976 and
does freelance writing. .
.
Cathy Burke
,
secretary, is a graduate of
Chandler School for Women and joined the Commission in June. .
.
Frederick
V. "Fritz" Casselman , is a graduate of Boston University Law School,
Patty A. Ciampa
,
is the Commission's bookkeeper. She is a graduate
of Julie Billiart High School in Boston and Burdett College. . Shirley
DeMarco is the Commission's election specialist and graduated from
Fitten Central High School in East Boston.
.
.
Diane Drapeau joined the
Commission last September and is a graduate of Suffolk University
Law School ... Jean Driscoll is a graduate of Boston College Law School
and joined the Commission last September ..
.
Philip J. Dunn came to
the Commission in September 1976 from Gregory, Von Lopik, and Higle,
a labor law firm in Michigan, and is a graduate of Northeastern University
Law School ... Sharon Henderson Ellis , a graduate of Suffolk University
Law School, joined the Commission September 1976. Prior to law school,
she served in the Peace Corps in Tunisia.
.
David F. Grunebaum came to
the Commission September 1976 after receiving a Masters in Labor Law
from New York University. He was previously in private law practice
in Boston, and served as a Vista volunteer. He is a graduate of
Boston University Law School ..
.
Alice T. Hintsa
,
hearing stenographer,
first came to the Commission in 1956. She took time off in between,
however, to teach evenings at the Stenotype Institute and to do some
freelance reporting.
.
.
Stuart A. Kaufman came to the Commission in March
1976, after serving as legal counsel to the legislature's Committee on
Public Service. He is a graduate of Boston College Law School, and
directs a community band in Brookline ... James M. Litton is a graduate of
New York University Law School. He was counsel to the International
Ladies Garment Workers Union in New York before coming to the Commission
in June 1976. .
.
Priscilla Lyons is the assistant to the executive
secretary and a graduate of Boston College Law School . .
.
Ralph Lyons
,
hearing stenographer, came to the Commission seven years ago after
a 14 year career in the railroad industry. He now teaches two
nights a week at Touch Shorthand Academy, and has a black belt in
judo ..
.
Robert B. McCormack , a graduate of Boston University Law
School, has been at the Commission since 1972. Prior to that, he
was defense counsel for the AMICA Insurance Company, and was in private
practice in Hingham.
.
.
John L. McLaughlin , labor relations examiner,
has been with the Commission 12 years. A graduate of Boston College,
he was previously with the National Labor Relations Board. .
.
Norener Reid
,
hearing stenographer, is a graduate of Boston Business School and
Touch Shorthand Academy. .
.
Dale Smith , is a graduate of Northwest High
School in St. Louis, Missouri and joined the Commission last November.
Ourania "Nea" Trypousis
,
secretary, is a student at Suffolk University,
majoring in business education. She works part-time at the Commission
between her studies .. .Arthur S. Weber, head clerk, is a retired
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senior examiner with the Postal Inspection Service. He has worked for
the Town of Braintree, the First National Bank, and the State Police
since his retirement ..
.
Judith A. Wong is a graduate of Boston University
Law School and joined the Commission last October. She had previously
worked at the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination. She
also holds the esteemed position of office softball coach. .
.
Jackie Young
,
is a candidate for a Ph.D. degree in labor relations from Rutgers
University and joined the Commission last May. She previously worked
as an organizer for several unions and has taught labor relations at the
university level . .
.
Janice Zimmermann
,
secretary, is a graduate of
Medford High School and joined the Commission last January. She is
expecting her first child in October.
IV. CASELOAD AND PRODUCTIVITY
The following is a detailed description of how the Commission
performs its four basic functions.
1 . Representation Cases
When employees or a union file a petition requesting the Commission
to conduct an election for a collective bargaining representative, the
Commission must determine the appropriate bargaining unit. This
requires a finding as to which employees share a "community of interest"
at the bargaining table. Sometimes the employer and the union consent
to an appropriate unit, and the Commission approves it. But if they
cannot agree, or if they propose an inappropriate unit, the Commission
conducts hearings to make a determination. After the unit is defined,
the Commission conducts a secret ballot election, and certifies the...
results. (See chart 3.) A special subset of representation petitions
is "clarification petitions," filed by the employee organization or the
employer for the purpose of clarifying or amending a recognized
or certified bargaining unit.
2 . Unfair Labor Practices
There are employment practices prohibited under Chapter 150E
§ 10(a) and (b)
,
Chapter 150A § 4(a) and (b) , which the employer
and the employee organization are prohibited from performing. If the
employer, or employee organization believes that an employee, employer
or employee organization has performed a prohibited practice, they can
file an unfair labor practice charge (prohibited practice charge) with
the Commission (Chart 4, Step A). The Commission conducts an informal
conference when such a charge is filed, (step B) , at which a Commission
agent obtains statements from both parties and attempts to bring about
a settlement (step C) . The agent reports the results of the conference
to the Commission (step D) . If a settlement is not reached and the
Commission finds that there is sufficient evidence to the charge to
-4-
warrant a hearing, a complaint is issued (step E) , and a formal (step F)
or expedited (step G) hearing is held. A hearing officer or Commissioner
presides at the hearings. During the hearings, witnesses are called
and evidence is introduced. After an expedited hearing, the hearing
officer issues a decision (step H) , which is appealable to the full
Commission (step I)
.
Subsequent to a formal hearing, the Commission
issues a decision (step J), which is appealable only to the courts
(step K)
.
3 . Strikes
Under Chapter 150E, public employees are prohibited from striking.
Thus, when employees engage in or threaten to engage in a strike, the
employer may petition the Commission to investigate. The Commission
requires that representatives of the employer and employee organization
appear for a formal investigation. The Commission "sets requirements
that must be complied with." Such an investigation is given highest
priority at the Commission.
4 . Request for Binding Arbitration
If an employer and an employee organization enter a written contract
which does not provide a grievance clause culminating in final and
binding arbitration, to be invoked in the event of any dispute concern-
ing the interpretation or application of such written agreement, the
Commission may order such arbitration upon the request of either party.
A . Caseload
Between 1966 and 1973, the Commission's caseload grew over
300 percent; since the passage of Chapter 150E in 1973, when state
employees were granted collective bargaining rights, the caseload has
grown an additional 20 percent.
Table 1 indicates these increases. Table 2 shows the total
filings of different types of cases during the past fiscal year. The
Commission's case code is explained in the table. Table 3 indicates
the number of elections which the Commission conducted this past year.
This number does not reflect the size of the elections, some of which
require the attendance of a majority of the staff. Table 3 also indi-
cates the total number of Hearing Officer and Commission Decisions
issued. Table 4 shows the number of hearings held with a breakdown
of the types of hearings; formal, expedited, informal conferences, and
other. (Other includes strike investigations, hearings on challenged
ballots, objections to an election, etc.). Table 5 details the number
of strike investigations, the number of actual work stoppages, and the
Commission's role in settling the disputes.
The following testimony presented by Chairman Cooper before
the Public Service Committee of the General Court, explains the
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Commission's role during strike investigations:
"The Commission's focus on strikes has been to get
the underlying dispute settled as quickly as possible.
We do not view our role as being merely a club to be
used by employers to get their employees back to work.
We will always order employees back to their jobs; but,
we will also look further into the causes of the strike
and attempt to get the parties back together and re-
solve the problem... Of the 47 strike petitions, we
have settled either at our offices or after an Order,
31 cases. This represents approximately 65 percent of
all the petitions filed. We are proud of this work."
"We regard our role in the Superior Court to be
somewhat different than acting as the agent of the
employer. The Commission appears before the Court
seeking enforcement of its Order. We attempt to guide
the Court in deciding what action should be taken. We
do not 'represent' the employer, we represent the Com-
mission in serving in the public interest. Thus we
define our role as being an aid to the Court in bring-
ing an end to the dispute. We seek to represent a
neutral position before the Court, but we always seek
to have the Court enjoin the work stoppage."
B
.
Productivity
The best way to illustrate each attorney's workload is to
multiply the number of hours spent on an average case, 50 (table 8),
by the total number of cases which reached decisions, 152. (152 x 50 =
7,600 person hours) 7,600 person hours is over 50% of available attorney
ime (8 attorneys x 35 hours per week x 50 weeks = 14,000). Im-
measurable amounts of time are also spent in disposing of additional
cases by dismissal, settlement or some other means; on court cases;
officer of the day work; executive sessions; and other duties. In
order to perform all of these duties, attorneys are working well in
excess of a regular work week.
V. COURT APPEARANCES
Parties to Commission decisions have the right under Chapter 30A
§ 14 to appeal those decisions within 30 days to the Superior Court.
Less than 87o of Commission decisions are appealed, and the majority
of those are affirmed by the Courts. Yet, court cases consume a
considerable amount of Commission time. Writing a brief can take a
week, as can researching a case. Time in court takes anywhere from
a few hours to a week; and at least another day can be spent preparing
oral arguments and attending to miscellaneous details.
VI. ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS
1 . Public Information and Community Relations
The Commission believes that an informed and educated public
contributes to the maintenance of stable labor relations. The more
knowledgeable employees and employers are of the law, the better they
will be able to abide by it, and take advantage of their rights under
it. The Commission therefore makes every effort to provide information
to the public and to meet with groups of employers and employees.
Our public information officer provides a link from the Commission to
the media and the general public. The public information officer answers
questions from the press concerning the status of various cases before
the Commission and issues press releases when the Commission renders
important decisions. The information officer is also responsible for
the bi-monthly MLRC News which provides information about the day- to-
day functioning of the Commission for labor relations professionals,
including labor and management representatives. Each issue contains
articles highlighting some of the Commission's more interesting cases;
analysis of some aspect of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 150E or
150A, or outside "Section 4"; information about people at the Commission;
legislative updates; and statistics on the Commission's caseload. MLRC
News is provided free of charge. Nearly 400 labor professionals including
those from other states and Canada receive the News by mail.
Each day an attorney or examiner is assigned to aid the many
people who call or walk into the Commission with labor-related
problems. Although the Commission cannot always solve such pro-
blems, the "officer of the day" offers advice on where to seek
assistance. The Commission established the officer of the day
position last year, because it has an obligation to assist the large
number of people who do not understand the maze of administrative
agencies regulating the employer-employee relationship.
The Commission supplies information to three local professional
publications in order to keep practitioners in the field of public
sector labor relations informed. The Massachusetts Labor Relations
Reporter publishes information concerning decisions, court cases,
hearing elections, complaints, and all other activities; Massachusetts
Labor Cases prints all Commissions decisions in full; and Massachusetts
Lawyers Weekly prints summaries of Commiss on decisions . Commission
decisions are also frequently reported in the Government Employee
Relations Report, the Bureau of National Affairs Labor Relations
Reference Manual, and the Commerce Clearing House Labor Cases.
The Commission actively participates in the Boston Bar
Association's Workshop for Labor Relations Practitioners. Commission-
ers or staff members have spoken at the Massachusetts Fire Chiefs
Conference, the New England Public Employers Association, the
Association of Massachusetts Town Counsels and City Solicitors, and
the Institute of Industrial Relations at Holy Cross College.
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Commission agents travel across the state in an effort to make
its services more accessible. Most elections are conducted at the
place of employment by the Commission agent. Commission agents also
travel periodically to the western part of the state to
conduct informal, formal, expedited hearings.
2 . Union Registration and Union Contract File
Sections 13 and 14 of Chapter 150E require the Labor Relations
Commission to maintain a list of employee organizations, and the
bargaining units they represent. Required information includes:
the name and address of current officers; an address where notices
can be sent; date of organization; date of certification; and the
expiration date of signed agreements. Each organization must also
file an annual report with the Commission containing: "the aims and
objectives of such organization, the scale of dues, initiation fee,
fines and assessments to be charged to the members, and the annual
salaries to be paid officers." This information is reported on
standardized forms, which are available to the public.
Public employers are required to file copies of all collective
bargaining agreements with the Commission.
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FINANCIAL STATMENT - FISCAL YEAR 1978
July 1, 1977 - June 30 f 1978
Received from General Appropriation $ 490,000 .00
Expenditures
Salaries $ 426,217.14
Special Services 7,564.26
Supplies 29,396.07
Travel 4,449.50
Other Services & Expenses 21 , 272 . 09
$ 488,899.06
Balance Unexpended $ 1,10 0.94
returned to State Treasury
Income from Sale of $ 4,639.75
Stenographic Records
-9-
FINANCIAL STATEMENT - FISCAL YEAR 1977
July 1, 1976 - June 30, 1977
Received from General Appropriation $449,800.00
*
Expenditures
Salaries $367,250.00
Special Services 10,635.00
Supplies 30,500.00
Travel 4,800.00
Other Services & Expenses 27,964.00
Total $441,149.00 $441,149.00
Balance Unexpended
Returned to State Treasury $ 8,651.00 $ 8,651.00
Income from Sale of
Stenographic Records $ 4,720.00 $ 4,720.00
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July 1, 1977 -
PERSONAL
Salaries as of
June 30, 1978
SERVICES
June 30, 1978
James S. Cooper Chairman $ 24,846 .48
Garry J. Wooters Member, Labor Relations Commission 22,796 .52
Joan G. Dolan Member, Labor Relations Commission 22,796 .52
Ann DaDalt Executive Secretary 18, 884 .32
Robert B. McCormack Counsel II 22, 514 .96
James M. Litton Counsel II 20, 228 .00
David F. Grunebaum Counsel II 19, 465 .68
Frederick V. Casselman Counsel II 18,703 .36
Stuart A. Kaufman Counsel II 19,465 .68
Philip Dunn Counsel I 16,072 .68
Sharon H. Ellis Counsel I 16,072 .68
Jean S. Driscoll Labor Relations Examiner 14,646 .84
John L. McLaughlin Labor Relations Examiner 18,228 .60
Judith A. Wong Sr. Employee Relations Examiner 15, 840 .76
Jacqueline A. Young Labor Relations Examiner 14 ,646 .84
Priscilla A. Lyons Asst. to Executive Secretary 13,130 .52
Ralph Lyons Hearings Stenographer 14,345 .24
Norener K. Reid Hearings Stenographer 13, 050 .44
Alice T. Hintsa Hearings Stenographer 14, 345 .24
Rita Alberti Confidential Secretary 11,755 .64
Diane M. Drapeau Election Specialist 11,755 . 6 4
Shirley DeMarco Election Specialist 11,755 .64
Arthur S . Weber Head Clerk 10, 627 .24
Catherine M. Burke Principal Clerk 9,118 .20
Dale E. Smith Principal Clerk 9,118 .20
Janice Zimmermann Sr. Clerk & Stenographer 8,437 .00
Ourania Trypousis Sr. Clerk & Stenographer 8,437 .00
Patricia A. Ciampa Senior Bookkeeper 8,920 .60
William A. Blanning Sr. Clerk & Stenographer 8,437 .00
Suzanne F. Sheats Jr. Clerk & Stenographer 7,654 .40
446,097 .92
Vacant Positions
Sr. Employee Relations Examiner
Sr. Clerk & Stenographer
Sr. Clerk & Typist
Sr. Clerk & Typist
$14,647 .00
8,437.00
8,159.00
8,159.00 39,402.00
485,499.92
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July 1, 1976 - June 30, 1977
PERSONAL SERVICES
Salaries as of June 30, 1977
James S. Cooper
Garry J. Wooters
Rita Alberti
Frederick V. Casselman
Patricia Ciampa
Ethel Conrad
Ann Da Dalt
Mary DiBlasio
Philip J. Dunn
Sharon H. Ellis
David F. Grunebaum
Alice T. Hintsa
Stuart A. Kaufman
Sharon Kinney
Mary J. Lally
Jean Lewis
Tames M. Litton
h Lyons
. ^ert McCormack
John L. McLaughlin
Ezaura P. Palys
Norener Reid
Harvey M. Shrage
Ourania Trypousis
Maria Walsh
Arthur S. Weber
Karen Zweig
Chairman $ 23, 850
.
20
Commis s ioner 21, , 850
,
,20
Principal Clerk 10, , 153 , 00
Counsel II 17; r 113. 20
Sr. Clerk and Typist 7,, 729 . 80
Sr. Clerk and Stenographer 7, r 787.,00
Labor Realtions Examiner 14,p 482
.
, 00
Sr. Clerk and Stenographer 7,,787..00
Sr. Employee Relations Examiner 13,, 899 , 60
Labor Relations Examiner 13, , 899 ,60
Counsel II 17,r 856 , 80
Hearings Stenographer 13, c r\ c, 605 . 80
Counsel II 17, o c. c, 856 O A. 80
Jr. Clerk and Stenographer 7,r 004 . 40
Labor Relations Examiner 17, *3 A At 39 4 a a. 00
Sr. Clerk and Stenographer 8,, 512 . A r\. 40
Counsel II 18,r 600 , 40
Hearings Stenographer 13,,605. , 80
Counsel II 20,r 831.,20
Labor Relations Examiner 17, , 394 . A A, 00
Principal Clerk 9,,591.,40
Hearings Stenographer 11,,921.,00
Asst. to Executive Secretary 12,,420. , 20
Sr. Clerk and Stenographer 7,,787..00
Sr. Bookkeeper 7,,787.,00
Head Clerk 9,,635..60
Sr. Employee Relations Examiner 13,,899..60
$273,,442..20
Vacant Positions
Executive Secretary
Administrative Secretary
Commissione r
$18,033.60
11,078.60
21,850.20
$50,962.40 $ 50,962.40
$324,404.60
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SUMMARY OF DECISIONS
Preface: Jurisdiction
The Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission (Commission) was created in
1937 when the General Court enacted the "Baby Wagner Act", St. 1937, c.436. This
statute appears as G.L.C.150A and covers all employers except the Commonwealth
or any political subdivision thereof. The Labor Management Relations Act, 1947
(LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 8.141 et. seq., covers employers engaged in interstate commerce
and preempts the Commission's exercise of jurisdiction, Guss v. Utah Labor
Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957); Foley, Hoag & Eliot, 2 MLC 1302 (1976); Foley,
Hoag & Eliot, 229 NLRB No. 80 (1977), 95 LRRM 1041. The National Labor
Relations Board (Board) declines to exercise its jurisdiction in a relatively narrow
area and is prohibited by law from reducing its jurisdictional standards below those
standards in effect on August 1, 1959. 29 U.S.C. 8164(c)(1). Recent amendments to
the LMRA have expanded the Board's jurisdiction to include health care
institutions. P.L. 93-360 (1974). Under the LMRA the Board does not have juris-
diction over any state or any political subdivision thereof. 29 U.S.C. 8.152(2).
In 1964 and 1965 the General Court enacted laws granting certain bargaining
rights to state and municipal employees. St. 1964, c.637; St. 1965, c.763. In 1973,
the General Court repealed the public sector collective bargaining statutes and
enacted a comprehensive bargaining law applicable to all public employees. St.
1973, c.1078. The new statute appears as G.L.C.150E. (hereinafter referred to as
"the Law").
One of the more confusing questions of jurisdiction concerns bus drivers.The
Board policy is to decline jurisdiction over that part of a transportation enterprise
engaged in transporting school children for any political subdivision of a state, and
the Commission will assert jurisdiction in those cases. Hudson Bus Lines, 4 MLC
1630 (1977); Lexington Taxi Corp., 3 MLC 1696 (1977); William S_. Carroll, Inc., 3
MLC 1627 (H.O., 1977);*cf. Mitrano Chevrolet-Main Street Garage, 2 MLC 1533
(1976).
I. Definitions
A. Employer
The term "employer" or "public employer" is defined as the Commonwealth
acting through the commissioner of administration, or any county, city, town or a
district acting through its chief executive officer. The term "employer" also
includes "any individual who is designated to represent one of these employers and
acts in its interest in dealing with public employees". One of the troublesome areas
of applying this definition concerns county government. In one case, County of
Hampden and Sheriff of the County of Hampden, 3 MLC 1076 (H.O., 1976), a hearing
officer found that the employer of employees of the sheriff's office was the county,
but that the chief executive officer under the Law was the sheriff and the county
* "H.O." denotes decisions issued by a duly designated hearing officer of the Com-
mission; other citations are to decisions of the full Commission. Both Commission
and hearing officer decisions are reported in Massachusetts Labor Cases, (MLC)
which is published by the Massachusetts Labor Relations Reporter, P.O. Box 48,
Boston, Massachusetts, Ma. 02101. Copies of decisions may be ordered directly
from the publisher.
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commissioners in a joint capacity. In reaching this conclusion, the hearing officer
examined the difficulties in bargaining with the county commissioners or the
sheriff individually; the problems in the appropriation process; and the possible
consequences in unfair labor practice cases. Although County of Hampden,
involved a representation case, another hearing officer found joint chief executive
officers in the Essex County Commission and the Board of Trustees of its
Agricultural and Technical Institute. County of Essex, 4 MLC 1230 (H.O., 1977).
However, on the municipal level see the Supreme Judicial Court's opinion with
respect to joint chief executives in Labor Relations Commission v. Town of Natick,
Mass. Adv. Sh. (1976) 31, 339 N.E. 2d 900. Recent amendments to the Law have
included the Chief Justice, Supreme Judicial Court employees (c.278, Acts of 1977),
housing authority employees (c.610, Acts of 1977), and employees of the State
Lottery Commission (c.937, Acts of 1977). In addition, chapter 760 of the Acts of
1962 applies certain provisions of chapter 150A to the Massachusetts Port
Authority, the Massachusetts Parking Authority, the Massachusetts Turnpike
Authority, and the Wood's Hole, Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket Steamship
Authority. Redevelopment authorities are not within the jurisdiction of the
Commission, Fall River Redevelopment Authority, 4 MLC 1690 (1978). A
Commission hearing officer has found a water pollution abatement district to be a
public employer under the Law. Upper Blackstone Water Pollution Abatement
District, 4 MLC 1156 (H.0. 1977).
B. Employee
The term "employee" has been broadly interpreted to encompass all individuals
employed by a public employer, except those specifically excluded by the Law.
City of Fitchburg, 2 MLC 1123 (1975). Thus, coverage of the Law extends to regu-
larly employed part-time employees, Pittsfield School Committee, 2 MLC 1271
(1976); County of Plymouth, 2 MLC 1106 (1975), including part-timers who are full-
time students, Quincy Library Department, 3 MLC 1517 (1977). Probationary
employees are entitled to protection under the Law, as are CETA employees. City
of Springfield, 2 MLC 1233 (1975); City of Fitchburg, 2 MLC 1123 (1975). The
Commission has also determined that hospital interns, residents, and fellows are
employees, despite contrary Board rulings. City of Cambridge, 2 MLC 1450 (1976);
Worcester City Hospital, 3 MLC 1290 (H.O., 1976) aff'd 4 MLC 1373 (1977).
However, employees of a private bus company which has contracted with a city to
bus school children are not considered public employees, Hudson Bus Lines, 4 MLC
1630 (1977).
1) Managerial Employees
Under the Law, employees shall be designated as managerial employees ex-
cluded from coverage only if they (a) participate to a substantial degree in formu-
lating or determining policy, (b) assist to a substantial degree in the preparation for
or conduct of collective bargaining on behalf of a public employer, or (c) have a
substantial responsibility involving the exercise of independent judgment of an
appellate responsibility not initially in effect in the administration of a collective
bargaining agreement or in personnel administration.
A position must be funded and filled before the issue of managerial exclusion
may be raised. Town of Wellesley, 2 MLC 1443 (1976). The Commission scrutinizes
employees' actual duties and responsibilities, without respect to those which may
be performed in the future. County of Worcester, 2 MLC 1273 (1976). Its analysis is
functional, rather than merely looking to titles, Masconomet Regional School
District, 2 MLC 1034 (1976); Wellesley School Committee, 1 MLC 1389 (1975T In
order for employees to be excluded as "managerial", their participation in any one
of the disjunctive requirements must be substantial, Lee School Committee, 3 MLC
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1496 (1977); Taunton School Committee. 1 MLC 1480 (1975); Town of Dedham, 4
MLC 1347 (H.O., 1977).
Exercise of supervisory authority, without more, does not make an individual
"managerial" within the meaning of the Law. Worcester School Committee, 3 MLC
1653 (1977); University of Massachusetts, 3 MLC 1179 (1976). For example,
evaluation of subordinates which is subject to review and approval and which has
limited impact upon personnel decisions is insufficient to exclude an employee as
"managerial". Masconomet Regional School District, 3 MLC 1034 (1976). New
Bedford School Committee, 2 MLC 1215 (1975); Framingham School Committee, 4
MLC 1298 (H.O., 1977).
A managerial employee's role in formulating policy must be more than advisory
and must have a significant impact upon a considerable part of the public enter-
prise. Contrast Masconomet Regional School District, supra with Wellesley School
Committee, supra; Worcester School Committee, 3 MLC 1653 (1977); Needham
School Committee, 3 MLC 1251 (1976); Town of Carlisle, 4 MLC 1538 (H.O., 1977);
Worcester Vocational School Department, 4 MLC 1277 (H.O., 1977); City of North-
ampton, 4 MLC 1352 (H.O., 1977). Where the personnel in question act merely as
policy conduits from whom suggestions are sometimes elicited, there is no
managerial exclusion. Holyoke School Committee, 4 MLC 1607 (1977).
Administrators who have never exercised appellate responsibility in the grie-
vance process and have only participated on isolated occasions in collective bar-
gaining are not managerial employees. Wellesley School Committee, 1 MLC 1389
(1975). Moreover, administrators who review contract proposals concerning the
teachers' unit to prevent a possible adverse impact on their own employment do not
substantially participate in collective bargaining. Town of Holbrook, 1 MLC 1468
(1975).
2) Confidential Employees
Confidential employees are excluded from coverage under the Law. The Com-
mission applies the confidential exclusion narrowly and balances the broad exten-
sion of collective bargaining rights against the potential danger of disrupting the
employer's operations. Silver Lake Regional School Committee, 1 MLC 1240 (1975);
Stoneham School Committee, 3 MLC 1390 (H.O., 1977).
Employees are confidential "only if they directly assist and act in a confidential
capacity" to a person excluded from the coverage of the Law. An employee must
have a continuing and substantial relationship with a managerial employee of such a
nature that there is a legitimate expectation of confidentiality in their routine and
recurring dealings. Littleton School Committee, 4 MLC 1405 (1977). However,
employees may directly assist excluded employees without assisting them in a
confidential capacity. University of Massachusetts, 3 MLC 1179 (1976). Thus a
managerial employee's reliance upon another employee as a conduit for policy
advice and personnel recommendations does not, standing alone, render the latter a
"confidential employee". See University of Massachusetts, 3 MLC 1179 (1976).
Similarly, access to sensitive material, such as financial data or personnel records,
without more, does not necessarily make an employee "confidential". Wellesley
School Committee, 1 MLC 1389 (1975); Blackstone-Millville Regional School
District, 4 MLC 1312 (H.O., 1977).
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In contrast, however, employees who regularly type contract proposals for use
by the employer in collective bargaining negotiations have been excluded as
"confidential". Silver Lake Regional School Committee, 1 MLC 1240 (1975).
Secretaries to school superintendents and school committees have generally been
excluded. Belchertown School Committee, 1 MLC 1304 (1975); Fall River School
Committee. 3 MLC 1591 (H.Q., 1977); Stoneham School Committee, 3 MLC 1390
(H.O., 1977). Secretaries who have regular and substantial exposure to labor re-
lations information and advance knowledge of bargaining positions have been held
to be "confidential", Worcester School Committee, 4 MLC 1015 (H.O., 1977).
II. Employee Rights To Organize And Bargain Collectively
Section 2 of the Law provides that "employees shall have the right to self-
organization and the right to form, join or assist any employee organization for the
purpose of bargaining collectively through representatives of their own choosing".
Furthermore, this section gives employees the right "to engage in lawful, concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, free from interference, restraint or coercion".
A. Protected Activities
Protected activities include: making pro-union speeches, Mount Wachusett
Community College, 1 MLC 1496 (1975); seeking the assistance of a union, Common-
wealth of Massachusetts, 2 MLC 1400 (1976); soliciting union authorization cards
and serving as union steward, Town of Wareham, 3 MLC 1334 (1976); serving as
union officer and member of union negotiating committee and protesting the em-
ployer's unilateral changes in working conditions, Town of Sharon, 3 MLC 1052
(1976) ; initiating a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement, Town of
Halifax, 1 MLC 1486 (1975); prosecuting a grievance not within the context of a con-
tractual grievance procedure, Harwich School Committee, 2 MLC 1095 (1975);
testifying before the Commission, City of Boston, 4 MLC 1033 (1977); distributing
leaflets and collecting signatures on a petition as an adjunct to the formal grie-
vance procedure, City of Boston, 4 MLC 1101 (1976); insisting upon the presence of a
union representative at an investigatory interview reasonably perceived as
potentially leading to discharge. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 4 MLC 1415
(1977) ; editing and publishing a union newsletter, Mount Wachusett Community
College, 1 MLC 1496 (1975); non-disruptive picketing of school committee meetings,
homes and businesses of school committee members, and distribution to parents of
leaflets in support of union organizational or bargaining objectives, Southern
Worcester County Regional Vocational School District, 2 MLC 1488 (1976); see also
City of Fitchburg, 2 MLC 1123 (1975).
B. Unprotected or Illegal Activities
Picketing or leafleting by public employees or an employee organization in
support of an unlawful strike is not protected activity. See Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, SI-29, (1976); Town of Franklin, SI-56, (1977).
Improper tactics intended to coerce the employer into accepting the union's
position, or illegal activities such as acts of vandalism, are not protected activity.
See City of Fitchburg, 2 MLC 1123 (1975). Conduct which is physically intimidating,
egregious or disruptive of the employer's business is also unprotected. Harwich
School Committee, 2 MLC 1095 (1975).
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III. Appropriate Bargaining Units
A. Statutory Criteria
The Legislature has mandated that the Commission give consideration to three
criteria: community of interest; efficiency of operations and effective dealings;
and safeguarding the rights of employees to effective representation. These
criteria are balanced to serve the fundamental statutory objective of providing for
stable and continuing labor relations.
1) Community of Interest
The "touchstone" of community of interest is a demonstration that the
requested employees comprise a coherent, homogeneous group with employee
interests sufficiently distinct from those of excluded employees to warrant
separate representation. Among the factors to be considered are: common
supervision; similar work environment; job requirements; education; training and
experience; and job interchange and work contact. Boston School Committee, 2
MLC 1557 (1976); Town of Sterling, 4 MLC 1473 (H.O. \9VfT.
Community of interest does not, however, require an identity of interest. So
long as there is no inherent conflict among consolidated groups of employees, they
need only be similarly, not identically, situated. Differences in work locations and
supervision need not destroy community of interest. Town of Harwich, 1 MLC 1376
(1975) . Thus, the professional faculty of the statewide network of community
colleges were placed in one overall unit rather than in individual units at each
campus. Community Colleges, 1 MLC 1426 (1975). Nurses with different work
schedules have been placed in a single unit. Town of Agawam, 3 MLC 1681 (H.O.,
1976). At the University of Massachusetts, department chairmen, part-time
faculty, librarians, and coaches were found to share a community of interest with
full-time "tenure track" faculty. University of Massachusetts, 3 MLC 1179 (1976).
Employees of a parks and recreation department were found to share a community
of interest with employees of a public works department. Town of Agawam, 4 MLC
1060 (H.O., 1977).
2) Efficiency of Operations and Effective Dealings
The "efficiency of operations and effective dealings" criterion has evolved into
the policy of including employees in the largest practicable bargaining unit.
Community Colleges, 1 MLC 1426 (1975); Boston School Committee, 2 MLC 1557
(1976) . In assessing a unit's potential effect, the Commission considers the impact
on the public employer's performance of its primary mission. Community Colleges,
1 MLC 1426 (1975).
Central to the required analysis is scrutiny of the employer's structure, delivery
of services, and fiscal administration. University of Massachusetts, 3 MLC D79
(1976). Given a finding of community of interest among employees sought in separ-
ate units, the Commission has ordered single, larger units coextensive with the
employer's administrative structure. Town of Agawam, 3 MLC 1681 (H.O., 1976);
Community Colleges, 1 MLC 1426 (1975).
3) Safeguarding Employee Rights to Effective Representation
G.L.C.150E precludes creation of a unit structure which would impair employees'
statutory rights. Statement in Support of Adoption of Amendment to Rules and
Regulations of the Commission Creating Statewide Occupational Units, 1 MLC
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1319 (1975). Thus, the Commission avoids establishing units with a diversity of
employment interests so marked as to produce inevitable conflicts in negotiating
and administering collective bargaining agreements. University of Massachusetts,
Union of Student Employees, 4 MLC 1384 (1977).
As noted above, the Commission considers bargaining history, employee wishes,
extent of organization, and the structure and practices of the particular workforce.
Critical in safeguarding employee rights to effective representation, however, is
the avoidance of units in which conflict is inherent because of an absence of
community of interest among the employees. See Statement...Creating Statewide
Occupational Units, 1 MLC 1319 (1975).
B. Policy Considerations
1) Commission Discretion
Within certain statutory limits, the Commission has broad discretion deter-
mining appropriate bargaining units. University of Massachusetts, 4 MLC 1384
(1977). Exclusions of certain types of employees may be derived from the overrid-
ing legislative purpose, see Commonwealth of Massachusetts, SCRX-2 (1973).
Where the union's petition describes an appropriate unit, the Commission will not
reject that unit because it is not the only appropriate unit, or because there is an
alternative unit that is more appropriate. Town of Agawam, 4MLC 1060 (H.O.,
1977); Lynn Hospital, 1 MLC 1046 (1974).
2) Policy Favoring Broad, Comprehensive Units
The Commission has continually affirmed its policy that broad, comprehensive
units, rather than small, fragmented units, best facilitate stable and continuing
labor relations. Generally, the largest unit sought will be found to be an appro-
priate unit, provided there is sufficient community of interest among the
petitioned-for employees. Pittsfield School Committee, 3 MLC 1490 (1977);
University of Massachusetts, 3 MLC 1179 (1976); City of Quincy, 3 MLC 1012 (1976);
Community Colleges, 1 MLC 1426 (1975); Town of Sterling, 4 MLC 1473 (H.O., 1977).
In keeping with the principle of the desirability of large units, the proliferation
of small units has not been encouraged. The Commission has refused to approve
the creation of small separate units where there are existing units whose members
share a community of interest with employees seeking a separate unit. Quincy
Library Department, 3 MLC 1517 (1977); Pittsfield School Committee, 3 MLC 1493
(1977); City of Lowell, 3 MLC 1261 (1976); Barnstable County, 3 MLC 1144 (1976).
Where there is the requisite community of interest, separate smaller units have
been rejected in favor of a single large unit. Boston School Committee, 2 MLC
1557 (1976); Town of Dartmouth, 1 MLC 1257 (1975); Town of Agawam, 3 MLC 1681
(H.O., 1976).
3) Unit Stipulations
When both an employer and an employee organization agree on the composition
of a bargaining unit, the Commission will generally adopt their agreement.
The Commission will not look beyond the clear meaning of a stipulation
mutually agreeable to both parties. Medford Housing Authority, 4 MLC 1458 (H.O.,
1977). The possibility that another unit may be equally or more appropriate will not
preclude the Commission's acceptance of a stipulation for a unit which is itself
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valid. Board of Trustees, State Colleges, 4 MLC 1428 (1977). An agreement of the
parties may, however, be rejected by the Commission if the stipulated unit is
contrary to law or policy. City of Lowell, 3 MLC 1260 (H.O., 1976), aff'd 3 MLC
1510 (1977).
4) Other factors
a. ) History, Extent of Organization, and Employee Wishes
In its unit determinations, the Commission also considers bargaining history,
extent of organization, and the wishes of employees. Town of Agawam, 4 MLC
1060 (H.O., 1977). Although bargaining history and employee wishes are taken into
account, they are factors lacking controlling weight. Boston School Committee, 2
MLC 1557 (1976); Community Colleges, 1 MLC 1426 (1975). Employee wishes become
an important factor only where there is a decision to be made between two or more
equally appropriate units. Weymouth School Committee, MCR-2427, 2428 (8/5/77).
The Commission has repeatedly stated that employee organizations may not
pick and choose among employees sharing a community of interest on the basis of
extent of organization. It must be demonstrated that the group has a community of
interest separate and distinct from other employees. Lynn Hospital, 1 MLC 1023
(1974).
b. ) Source of Funding
The source of funding of an employee's position is not dispositive in unit deter-
mination. A finding of community of interest between employees funded from
sources other than the public employer and employees paid directly by the public
employer will lead to an overall unit which includes CETA employees. City of
Springfield, 2 MLC 1233 (1975); Town of Sheffield, 4 MLC 1144 (H.O., 1977);TfItle I
teachers), Somerville School Committee, 4 MLC 1244 (H.O., 1977). A contrary
result follows if there is an insufficient community of interest between two groups.
City of Fall River, 3 MLC 1320 (H.O., 1977) (teacher aides and lunchroom aides);
Somerville School Committee, 4 MLC 1244 (H.O. 1977) (Project SCALE teachers).
C. Separate Supervisory Units
Unlike the National Labor Relations Act, Chapter 150E does not exclude super-
visory employees from participation in collective bargaining. However, the Com-
mission favors units of supervisors separate from rank and file units. Chicopee
School Committee, 1 MLC 1195 (1974).
In determining whether employees are supervisors who should be placed in a
separate unit, the Commission examines both supervisory authority and the total
relationship between employees, City of Revere, 4 MLC 1593 (H.O., 1977), affd., 4
MLC (1978); University of Massachusetts, 3 MLC 1179 (1976). Supervisors are
employees with independent authority or effective recommendatory powers in
major personnel decisions such as hiring, transfer, suspension, promotion, and
discharge. They also have the authority to direct employees and to resolve grie-
vances. University of Massachusetts, 3 MLC 1179 (1976). When supervisory power is
shared to a great degree with other employees and no conflicts are apparent,
employees will not be placed in a separate unit. University of Massachusetts, 3
MLC 1179 (1976).
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In the area of professional school employees and police officers, the Commis-
sion has stated in numerous cases that it favors the creation of two units separating
administrative employees from those they supervise. City of Taunton, 3 MLC 1686
(H.O., 1977); City of Everett, 3 MLC 1372 (1977); Chicopee School Committee, 1
MLC 1195 (1974). It may depart from this approach and allow an over-all unit only
in small towns where the size of an administrative unit would significantly impair
the bargaining strength of the administrators. Cambridge Police Department, 2
MLC 1027 (1975); Chicopee School Committee, 1 MLC 1195 (1974).
D. Employees Other Than Regular Full-Time Employees
1) Part-Time Employees
Litigation in this area has involved part-timers, seasonal employees, and those
whose salary comes from a source other than the Chapter 150E public employer.
The Commission has repeatedly held that individuals other than regular full-time
workers are "employees" within the meaning of Chapter 150E. Pittsfield School
Committee, 2 MLC 1523 (1976); City of Springfield, 2 MLC 1233 (1975); Town of
Lincoln, 1 MLC 1422 (1975); Town of Burlington, 3 MLC 1350 (H.O., 1977). Thus, the
issue in these cases is the statutory standards described in Section A above.
Part-time employees who have a substantial community of interest in wages,
hours, and working conditions with those in a unit of full-timers are regarded as
"regular" part-time employees and will be included in the bargaining unit. Town of
Swansea, 3 MLC 1678 (H.O., 1977), aff'd 4 MLC 1527 (1977); Quincy Library Dept., 3
MLC 1517 (1977); University of Massachusetts, 3 MLC 1179 (1976); Southboro School
Committee, 2 MLC 1467 (1976); County of Plymouth, 2 MLC 1106 (1975); (part-time
police officers), Town of Sterling, 4 MLC 1473 (H.Q., 1977). If, however, part-time
employees lack a community of interest with full-timers, they will be excluded
from the unit. Town of Lincoln, 1 MLC 1422 (1975); Town of Hamilton, 2 MLC 1512
(H.O., 1976).
Part-timers seeking a separate unit must demonstrate a community of interest
among themselves for the Commission to find such a unit appropriate. A similarity
of interests has been deemed sufficient to warrant a separate unit of evening
school teachers, Pittsfield School Committee, 2 MLC 1523 (1976). Relative stability
of part-time work force, consistency in hours, and clearly definable boundaries of
bargaining unit are factors weighing in favor of a separate part-timers' unit.
Gloucester School Committee, 4 MLC 1497 (H.O., 1977). Where these factors are
not present, a separate unit is inappropriate. Town of Lincoln, 1 MLC 1422 (1975);
Town of Saugus, 4 MLC 1361 (H.O., 1977).
2) Seasonal and Casual Employees
The appropriateness of bargaining units containing substantial numbers of
"seasonal" employees has normally been determined based upon the employees'
expectation of continuing employment. Similarly, employees are not considered
"casuals" where their hours are regular and consistent and there is a reasonable
expectation of rehire or reassignment on a year-to-year basis. Gloucester School
Committee, 4 MLC 1497 (H.O., 1977). If there is substantial stability in the work
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force, year after year, the "seasonals" are either included in a bargaining unit with
the regulars, or held to constitute their own separate unit. Bay State Harness
Raceway
,
2 MLC 1340 (1976); City of Gloucester, 1 MLC 1170 (1974). Where, how-
ever, the public employer's required budgetary process would make effective bar-
gaining for seasonal employees impossible, a separate unit has not been allowed.
City of Gloucester, 1 MLC 1170 (1974).
E. Modification of Existing Bargaining Units
The Commission has broad power to investigate and decide representation
questions arising out of existing units. See City of Boston, 2 MLC 1353 (1976). This
includes the power to exclude from existing units employees who are managerial.
Wellesley School Committee, 1 MLC 1389 (1975); confidential, Silver Lake Regional
School Committee, 1 MLC 1240 (1975); or otherwise inappropriately included, City
of Boston, 2 MLC 1353 (1976). A CAS petition is a petition for clarification of the
bargaining unit and must be filed by the employer or the employee organization.
An individual has no standing to file a CAS petition; however, he or she has a more
limited right to request the Commission under MLRC Rules to investigate a matter
concerning certification. See MLRC Rule 14.15* Town of Burlington, MCR-2452,
CAS-2120, 4 MLC
_
(H.O., 1978).
1) Severance and Exclusion
Petitions seeking to sever employees from currently existing units are normally
not favored. Saugus School Committee, 2 MLC 1412 (1976). It must be proved that
the employees sought constitute a functionally distinct group with special interests
sufficiently distinguishable from those of other unit employees. Evidence must
indicate special negotiating concerns which have caused significant divisions
within the existing bargaining unit. The Commission also considers the industry
practice of inclusions and exclusions from over-all units the employees seek to
sever. Saugus School Committee, 2 MLC 1412 (1976); City of Beverly, 1 MLC 1108
(1974). The petitioner must demonstrate that the stability of labor relations and
effective representation will not be unnecessarily compromised by the severance.
Massachusetts Port Authority, 2 MLC 1408 (1976).
In cases involving severance of police supervisors, however, the issue is
generally not whether there should be a separate supervisory unit but where the
division should be made once the department has reached a sufficient size.
Cambridge Police Department, 2 MLC 1027 (1975). The Commission's standard for
determining at which rank to sever police units is based on finding the rank at
which the distinction between supervisory and non-supervisory responsibilities is
manifested. Intra-union conflict at the bargaining table may be relevant. This
question remains undecided. City of Everett, 3 MLC 1372 (1977); City of Taunton, 3
MLC 1686 (H.O., 1977).
Separate units for superior officers in fire departments have not been created
where there is a long history of collective bargaining in an overall unit. Town of
Dedham
, 3 MLC 1130 (H.O. 1976), affd 3 MLC 1332 (1976), reaffd 4 MLC ~H977T;
but see Town of Greenfield, 4 MLC 1225 (H.O., 1977) where a Commission hearing
officer excluded deputy chiefs because of their extensive supervisory authority
(including the administration of discipline) and the absence of a long bargaining
history in an overall unit.
The Rules and Regulations of the Commission appear as Chapter 402 of the Code
of Massachusetts Regulations (CMR). The official cite 402 CMR 14.15 is
abbreviated herein as MLRC Rule 14.15.
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2) Stipulations by the Parties
Where both employer and the employee organization stipulate that certain
confidential positions should be excluded from a previously issued certification, the
Commission will adopt that stipulation as long as it is not in conflict with the
Commission's rules or established practices. When the Commission has previously
determined the appropriate bargaining unit and the employer refuses to bargain
because of alleged inappropriateness of the unit, the decision will stand unless the
employer can show changed circumstances. Needham School Committee, 4 MLC
1120 (1977).
If both parties have agreed to include an employee in a unit and subsequently
one of the parties seeks exclusion over the objection of the other, the party seeking
exclusion may be estopped for at least the duration of the collective bargaining
agreement. City of Somerville, 2 MLC 1546 (1976); Pittsfield School Committee, 3
MLC 1082 (1976T7
3) Accretion
The Commission in several cases has enunciated the principles to be applied
when a party seeks to accrete job classificiations to an existing bargaining unit.
Accretion will be permitted when: (1) a new employee classification has been
created; (2) an employer's operations have been expanded subsequent to a certifica-
tion and employees are normal accretions; or, (3) the job function of the disputed
title has changed significantly since certification or recognition. Additionally, the
Commission will look to the intent of the parties at the time of certification or
recognition and the community of interest between the disputed employees and
members of the unit. Peabody School Committee, 3 MLC 1512 (1977); City of Lynn.
2 MLC 1541 (1976); University of Massachusetts, Boston, 2 MLC 1001 (f9T5);~CTtyoT
Somerville, 1 MLC 1234 (1975); Amesbury School Committee, 3 MLC 1447 (H.O.,
1977X
The Commission will not allow accretion if: (1) the classifications sought by the
union were in existence prior to the original election and certification, and were
excluded from the unit by the parties; (2) neither certification nor subsequent
contracts had included those classifications; (3) the basic job functions of those
classifications remains the same; (4) the previously excluded employees do not
work in the same area as the unit employees; (5) the employees perform different
job functions and have different supervisors. Peabody School Committee, supra;
Pittsfield School Committee, 3 MLC 1082 (H.O., 1976); Town of Agawam, 2 MLC
1367 (H.O., 1976).
Where accretion has not been allowed, the Commission may, in rare cases,
permit a self-determination election among employees holding the disputed titles.
They are given the choice of being represented by the incumbent in an existing
unit, or of not being represented in any unit. A self-determination election may be
ordered where: the petition is accompanied by a sufficient showing of interest;
there is sufficient community of interest between the employees in disputed titles
and employees in the existing unit; the petition seeks to include all such employees;
and the reasons for the original exclusion no longer pertain. City of Quincy, 3 MLC
1326 (H.O., 1976), aff'd 3 MLC 1517 (1977).
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IV. Procedures for Determining Bargaining Representatives
A. Notice
Commission rules require that all interested parties be given notice of repre-
sentation proceedings. MLRC Rule 14. The petitioning employee organization and
the employer have a joint obligation to provide the Commission with information
regarding other organizations that may represent any employees affected by the
petition. City of Quincy, CAS-2062 (1976).
B. Contract and Certification Bars to Elections
The contract bar doctrine prohibits the direction of an election, except for good
cause, if a valid collective bargaining agreement is in effect. The doctrine is
discretionary. It will be applied or waived depending on the facts of the case with
a view toward fairness for employer and employees alike and stability of bargaining
agreements. Easton School Committee, 2 MLC 1111 (1975); Southeastern Mass.
University, 1 MLC 1418 (1975).
A contract must be signed by all parties to operate as a bar. Even when the
terms were agreed on, the parties had agreed to sign, the contract was in near final
form and some provisions had already been implemented, the contract was held
ineffective as a bar because it was unsigned. Essex County, 4 MLC 1147 (H.O.,
1977); Nashoba Valley Technical High School District. 4 MLC 1589 (H.O., 1977);
Somerville School Committee, 2 MLC 1335 (H.O., 1976); Town of Maynard, 2 MLC
1253 (H.O., 1975). An expired contract will not operate as a bar even though the
parties agree to continue its terms during negotiations. Brockton School Commit-
tee, 4 MLC 1005 (1977); University of Massachusetts^ MLC 1001 (1975). A successor
contract negotiated and ratified prior to the open period under the existing
contract will not bar a petition which would be timely had the new agreement not
been negotiated. Saugus School Committee, 2 MLC 1414 (1976). A contract which
does not provide benefits for the employees sought in a petition will not act as a
bar. Hudson Bus Lines, 4 MLC 1630 (1977).
The expansion of the bargaining unit is not such an unusual occurrence as to
waive the contract bar if the complement of employees from the old unit is a
substantial part of the new unit and representative of the employees in the ex-
panded unit. North Middlesex Regional School District, MCR-2665, 4 MLC
(H.O., 1978).
In rare situations, the Commission may approve a contractual waiver of the
contract bar rule when such a waiver serves the purposes of the Law. Worcester
School Committee, 4 MLC 1015 (H.O., 1977). The rule will not be waived, however,
when members of the bargaining unit are dissatisfied with their representative or
when intra-union disputes fall short of a schism going to the very identity of the
bargaining representative. City of Sale m, 1 MLC 1172 (1974); City of Worcester, 1
MLC 1069 (1974).
Notwithstanding the general contract bar rule, MLRC Rule 14.06 provides that
an election petition will be entertained if filed during an "open period" of no more
than 180 days and no fewer than 150 days prior to the termination date of the con-
tract. A petition must be actually received at the Commission's office within the
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180-to-150 day open period. City of Springfield, 1 MLC 1446 (1975). Petitions filed
during the open period may be amended after the end of the open period if the
amendment does not claim a unit larger and substantially different from that
originally sought. Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Unit 4 ), SCR-2100, (1977).
The certification bar rule provides that no election will be directed in a unit
within one year of a prior election. However, a rival petition for certification will
be processed by the Commission even though filed prior to the expiration of the
cerification year if the election is conducted after the statutory twelve-month
period. There must be no contract bar. City of Gardner, 1 MLC 1115 (1974).
C. Representation Petition and Hearings
MLRC Rule 14.05 requires that a petitioning employee organization be
designated as the exclusive representative by 30 percent of the employees in the
proposed unit. The Commission's review of this showing of interest is an
administrative determination which is not subject to challenge. Duxbury School
Department, 1 MLC 1020 (1974). Local 829, Teamsters, 4 MLC 1673 (1978). The 30
percent requirement has been met where petitioner based its showing on the
employer's inaccurate statement of the number of employees in the unit.
Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Unit 4), SCR-2100, (1977).
While an employer may file a representation petition, it will be dismissed where
no employee organization seeks recognition or claims majority status in the unit
sought. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1 MLC 1190 (1974). Employees may
petition for a decertification election but must seek a unit coextensive with the
previously certified or recognized unit. Decertification elections for a portion of a
bargaining unit are not permitted. City of Lynn, 2 MLC 1541 (1976).
A petition may be amended prior to or at the representation hearing if the
amended petition does not seek a substantially larger or different unit. Common-
wealth of Massachusetts, (Unit 4), SCR-2100, (1977). The Commission will order an
election where neither the employer nor the incumbent appears at a scheduled
hearing but where the petitioning union presents a sufficient showing of interest.
Town of Auburn, MCR-2507, 4 MLC
_
_
(1977). An election may also be directed
without a hearing where there are no litigable issues. City of Lowell, MCR-2538, 4
MLC (1977). A motion to intervene is untimely where hearings have been closed,
an election has been ordered, and where granting the motion would require delaying
the election, Town of Duxbury, 4 MLC 1168 (1977).
Generally, unless the charging party requests the Commission to proceed, no
election will be directed while unfair labor practices affecting the involved unit are
pending. Town of Wareham, 2 MLC 1547 (1976).
D. Elections: Procedures, Objections, and Challenges
1) In General
The Commission exercises wide discretion in the manner and method of
conducting representation elections. Community Colleges, 2 MLC 1146 (1975).
Thus, on-site or mail ballot elections may be ordered. Furthermore, the
Commission has the exclusive power to determine the name of the organization
appearing on the ballot in order to insure that the ballot is not confusing to the
voters. Department of Public Welfare, 1 MLC 1127 (1974). The Commission's
certification runs to the employee organization appearing on the ballot. Common-
wealth of Massachusetts (Units 1, 2, 6, 8 and 9), 2 MLC 1322 (1976). The Commission
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will adopt the standards applied by the National Labor Relations Board in deter-
mining eligibility of voters who were employed on the cut-off date, but who are not
actively employed at the time of the election. Town of Dudley, 4 MLC 1291 (1977).
2) . Procedure for Challenges
MLRC Rule 14.12 applies to election challenges and objections.
Objections to an election must be filed within five days of the tally of ballots.
Only a party in interest can object to an election. Boston School Committee, 3
MLC 1043 (1976). A party seeking to set aside an election because of conduct
occurring prior to or during the course of the election must furnish substantial
evidence that the conduct had a significant impact on the election results. City of
Boston, 2 MLC 1275 (1976).
No post-election hearing will be conducted if the objections do not raise sub-
stantial questions of fact or a legally significant basis for setting aside the
election. Rockland Police Department, 1 MLC 1217 (1974). City of Brockton, 4 MLC
1005 (1977^ Matters raised as objections to the election will not be considered if
they should have been raised at the pre-election representation hearing. Rockland
Police Dept., 1 MLC 1217 (1974).
The Commission has permitted employees whose managerial status was
questioned to vote under challenge. It was ruled that the determination of
managerial status would be made after the election and the employees' ballots
would not be counted until the challenges were resolved. Community Colleges, 2
MLC 1146 (1975). An employee organization's failure to comply with the filing
requirements of sections 13 and 14 of the Law does not require that an election be
set aside. See, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2 MLC 1322 (1976), where the
Commission conditioned certification upon the petitioner's expeditious compliance
with the Law's reporting provisions. Sullivan v. Labor Relations Commission, 1977
Mass. App. Adv. Sh. 904, 364 N.E.2d 1099.
3) Misrepresentation and Interference
An election will not be set aside on the ground of misrepresentation unless a
party has substantially misrepresented a highly material fact, the truth of which
lies within the special knowledge of the party making the misrepresentation. Nor
will an election be overturned if the voters have independent knowledge with which
to evaluate the misrepresentation or if there was no substantial impact on the
election. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 3 MLC 1067 (1976).
Minimal inaccuracies in the voter eligibility list are not sufficient to invalidate
an election. An employer's good faith and substantial effort to provide the list will
suffice. City of Quincy, 1 MLC 1161 (1974).
But where one of the parties to a mail election distributed copies of the Com-
mission's specimen ballot with partisan election propaganda superimposed on it, the
Commission found that such propaganda issued close to the time of the election,
was cause to set that election aside. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2 MLC 1261
(1976).
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Where there is no allegation of coercion, the mere presence of union agents in a
polling area is not a sufficient basis for setting aside an election. Local 829
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, 3 MLC 1696 (1977). In a close election, however, the Commission will not
certify the results when a large proportion of ballots was cast during a time that
employees congregated in the immediate voting area and conversed among
themselves. Local 829, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen, and Helpers of America, 3 MLC 1696 (1977).
E. Voluntary Recognition
MLRC Rule 14.06(2) provides for voluntary recognition of an employee
organization by the employer. In order to enter into a recognition agreement the
employer must: (1) have a good faith belief in the employee organization's majority
status in the unit; (2) post a notice of intention to recognize the employee
organization for a period of twenty days prior to recognition; and (3) set forth in
writing in the agreement the specific unit involved. No recognition may be granted
where, during the posting period, a valid petition raising a question of representation
has been filed with the Commission.
V. Duty Of Fair Representation
Section 5 of the Law provides that the exclusive representative "...shall be
responsible for representing the interests of all [unit] employees without discrimi-
nation and without regard to employee organization membership."
The Commission has interpreted this section to impose upon employee organiza-
tions a duty to represent fairly all members of the unit in all phases of collective
bargaining, including both the negotiating of contracts and the processing of grie-
vances. A breach of this duty is considered a prohibited practice. Framingham
School Committee, 2 MLC 1292 (1976). In that case, the Association was found to
have breached its duty of fair representation by withdrawing a meritorious
grievance without informing the grievant or his attorney, and by refusing to bear
one-half the cost of arbitration as provided in the collective bargaining agreement.
Although a union may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process
it in a prefunctory manner, it need" not formally process every grievance filed if it
in good faith determines that a grievance is without merit. Local 285, SEIU, 3
MLC 1646 (1976); Robert W. Kreps and AFSCME, 3 MLC 1087 (H.O., 1976). A union
does commit a prohibited practice, however, when it coerces an employee into
becoming a union member by suggesting that the quality of representation in the
grievance procedure is dependent on union membership. Local 285, SEIU, 3 MLC
1646 (1976).
VI. Duty To Bargain
Section 6 of the Law obligates employers and unions to meet, including
meetings in advance of the employer's budget-making process, and to negotiate in
good faith about wages, hours, standards of productivity and performance, and any
other terms and conditions of employment. Violations of the duty to bargain are
prohibited practices under sections 10(a)(5) and 10(b)(2) of the Law.
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A. Scope of Bargaining
An examination of the duty to bargain often involves an initial determination of
the scope of bargaining, i.e., which subjects must be bargained over and those
subjects which may be bargained over.
Scope of bargaining issues are resolved by categorizing disputed subject matters
as either mandatory or non-mandatory subjects of bargaining. Town of Danvers, 3
MLC 1559 (1977). If a particular subject is within the mandatory scope of bar-
gaining, either party commits an unfair labor practice when it refuses a demand to
negotiate. When a contract includes no waiver clause or other indication that the
contract was intended to represent the entire and complete agreement of the
parties, those parties have a continuing duty to bargain upon request about all
mandatory subjects never bargained or embodied in the contract. City of Salem, 4
MLC 1196 (H.O., 1977).
The parties may bargain over non-mandatory subjects but neither party may
bargain to impasse over such subjects. IAFF, Local 1009, 2 MLC 1238 (1975);
Plainville School Committee, 4 MLC 1461 (H.O., 1977); Town of Andover, 4 MLC 1081
(1977). While it is clear that an employer does not have the duty to bargain over
non-mandatory subjects, the employer must bargain over the impact of a
managerial decision which would affect a mandatory subject of bargaining. Leo-
minister School Committee, 3 MLC 1530 (H.O., 1977), affd. 4 MLC 1512 (1977);
Newton School Custodian Association, 4 MLC 1334 (H.O., 1977); Town of Andover, 3
MLC 1710 (1977); Groton School Committee, 1 MLC 1221 (1975).
1) Mandatory Subjects
In very general terms, mandatory subjects of bargaining are those with a direct
impact on terms and conditions of employment. Permissive subjects are those
involving core governmental decisions removed from terms and conditions of
employment. Town of Danvers, 3 MLC 1559 (1977).
The Commission has held that the following are mandatory subjects of
bargaining: initial wages for new unit positions, Melrose School Committee, 3 MLC
1302 (1976); Northeast Regional School Committee, 1 MLC 1005 (1974); insurance
costs, Medford School Committee, 4 MLC 1450 (H.Q., 1977); working hours, work
load, seniority, Medford School Committee, 1 MLC 1250 (1975); work assignments
and job duties, Town of Danvers, 3 MLC 1559 (1977); assignment of unit work to
non-unit personnel, Town of Andover, 3 MLC 1710 (1977); payday schedules and
compensation for added duties, Lawrence School Committee, 3 MLC 1304 (1976);
work rules relating to policy on check-cashing time, Norwood School Committee, 4
MLC 1467 (H.O., 1977); promotion procedures; Town of Danvers, 3 MLC 1559 (1976);
performance evaluation systems, Town of Wayland, 3 MLC 1724 (1977). Also subject
to mandatory bargaining are: residency requirements for continued employment
and promotion of unit members, Boston School Committee, 3 MLC 1630 (1977); City
of Worcester, 4 MLC 1285 (H.O., 1977); Lynn School Committee, 4 MLC 1104 (H.O.,
1977); granting of leave, City of Boston, 3 MLC 1450 (1977); holiday time off, Town
of East Bridgewater, 4 MLC 1486 (H.O., 1977); employee use of non-active working
time, City of Everett, 2 MLC 1471 (1976); wage re-opener provisions, Medford
School Committee, 3 MLC 1413 (1977); number of employees on a piece of
firefighting apparatus when it responds to an alarm to the extent that a question of
safety is raised, City of Newton, 4 MLC 1282 (1977), aff. City of Newton, 2 MLC
1192 (H.O., 1975); plant rules and on-premise access to employees for the
transaction of union business, Town of Marblehead, 1 MLC 1140 (1975); the impact of
a layoff decision, Newton School Custodian Association, 4 MLC 1334 (H.O., 1977);
implementation of a decision to contract out work previously done by bargaining
unit employees, City of Boston, 4 MLC 1202 (1977).
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2) Non-Mandatory Subjects
The Commission has found the following topics to be non-mandatory subjects of
bargaining: school curriculum decisions, Groton School Committee, 1 MLC 1224
(1974); minimum manning per shift, Town of Danvers, 3 MLC 1559 (1977); wage
parity clauses, City of Cambridge, 3 MLC 1587 (H.O., 1977), aff'd 4 MLC 1447 (1977),
position consolidations, Lawrence School Committee, 3 MLC 1304 (1976); bargaining
open to the public, Town of Marion, 2 MLC 1256 (1975); hiring of additional
employees to perform unit work, Town of Andover, 3 MLC 1710 (1977).
In Worcester Police Officials Association, 4 MLC 1366 (1977), the Commission
declined to determine whether certain proposals were "legal" where the alleged
illegality concerned a mandatory topic which was subject to
B. Good Faith Bargaining
1) In General
The "good faith" requirement of the statute is an intangible factor provable only
by inference or implication from the behavior of the parties. It precludes mere
surface bargaining, or avoiding a real attempt to reach a resolution while
purporting to be meeting for the purpose of bargaining. City of Chicopee, 2 MLC
1071 (1975).
The duty does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or make a conces-
sion. It does require, however, that the parties enter into discussions with an open
and fair mind, have a sincere purpose to find a basis of agreement, and make
reasonable efforts to compromise their differences. King Philip Regional School
Committee, 2 MLC 1393 (1976); City of Chicopee, 2 MLC 1071 (1975); Berlin-
Boylston Regional School Committee, 3 MLC 1700 (H.O., 1977); City of Chicopee, 2
MLC 1071 (H.O., 1975); PlainviUe School Committee, 4 MLC 1461 (H.O., 1977). In
assessing the good faith requirement, the Commission will look not merely to
isolated, specific instances of bad faith but to the totality of the parties' conduct,
including acts away from the bargaining table. Berlin-Boylston, 3 MLC 1700 (H.O.,
1977); King Philip, 2 MLC 1393 (1976).
2) Refusal to Negotiate
Refusal to meet with the union when it has requested a negotiating session is a
refusal to bargain in good faith. City of Chelsea, 3 MLC 1169 (1976); City of
Chelsea, 2 MLC 1432 (1976).
a.) Attempts to Bypass Union
It is well-established that the duty to bargain collectively with the exclusive
representative mandates that an employer may not deal directly with employees on
matters that are properly the subject of negotiations with the employees'
representative. Thus, an employer who bypasses a union to deal directly with
individual employees violates the duty to bargain in good faith. Blue Hills Regional
School Committee, 3 MLC 1613 (1977); Lawrence School Committee, 3 MLC 1304
(1976).
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b.) Certification; One Year Presumption of Majority Status
During the year following certification a union is irrebutably presumed to have
majority status. Thus an employer must bargain with the certified representative
during the certification year even if the union has lost majority status. City of
Cambridge, 4 MLC 1044 (1977). Similarly, new employees are presumed to support
the union in the same proportion as old employees did at the time of the election.
Therefore, as a matter of law, evidence of turnover in workforce is irrelevant for
the purposes of determining the employer's duty to bargain during the certification
year. City of Cambridge, 4 MLC 1044 (1977).
c. ) Funding; Bargaining Prior to Budget
An assumption that the legislative body will ultimately reject a funding request
does not excuse an initial refusal to negotiate. Middlesex County Commissioners, 3
MLC 1594 (1977). Similarly, the Commission has found a violation of the duty to
bargain where an employer refused to schedule bargaining sessions until after its
budget had been submitted. In such a situation the employer could not claim that
its negotiations were being conducted in good faith when it was locked into its
already fixed budget. City of Chicopee, 2 MLC 1071 (H.O., 1975). Nor may a town
offer legislation affecting wages and conditions employment to the town council
while contract negotiations are in progress, even where the town asserts that the
changes will not go into effect until after an agreement with the union is reached.
Town of Arlington, 4 MLC 1644 (H.O., 1977).
d. ) Effect of Prohibited Practice Charges and Litigation
An employer cannot refuse to bargain because a prohibited practice charge has
been brought against it. Similarly, bargaining may not be contingent upon the
withdrawal of resolution of pending prohibited practice charges. Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, SUP-2078B, (1976); Berlin-Boylston Regional School Committee, 3
MLC 1700 (H.O., 1977); Southern Worcester County Regional Vocational School
District, 2 MLC 1488 (1976). Bargaining cannot be delayed or pre-conditioned upon
the resolution of pending litigation. Town of Ipswich, 4 MLC 1600 (1977)
3) Employer Negotiator
The employer must appoint a negotiator. City of Chelsea, 3 MLC 1169 (1976).
Although an employer does not have to be represented by a person with authority to
conclude a binding contract, the character and powers of the employer's repre-
sentative are factors which are considered in determining whether bargaining has
been conducted in good faith. The Commission may find a violation of the duty if
the employer's representative has authority to contract and attends none of the
bargaining sessions or has no authority to make commitments on any vital or
substantive provisions of a proposed contract. The authority of an employer's
representative is deficient if it is limited to the transmittal of proposals to and
from the employer, discussion concerning such proposals, and the making of recom-
mendations to the employer. Middlesex County Commissioners, 3 MLC 1594 (1977).
If an employer representative's authority is limited, the employer must so inform
the union. Spencer-East Brookfield School Committee, 3 MLC 1400 (H.O., 1977).
Where the authority of the Personnel Board was ambiguous, but they actively
supported the agreement before the Selectmen, they bargained in good faith. Town
of Millbury, 4 MLC 1267 (H.O., 1977).
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4) Open Meetings and Disclosure
Since the environment in which negotiations take place is so important to the
proper functioning of the bargaining process, the Commission has found that
insistence on bargaining in open session (i.e., bargaining meetings open to the
public) violates the Law. Town of Winchendon, 3 MLC 1316 (1976); Town of Marion,
2 MLC 1256 (1975); Town of Norton, 3 MLC 1140 (1976). This applies as well to
grievance meetings held during the life of the contract. Ayer School Committee, 4
MLC 1027 (H.O., 1977), aff'd 4 MLC 1478; Webster School Committee, 4 MLC 1692
(H.O., 1978).
The open meeting requirements of G.L.c.39,S.23b do not apply to collective
bargaining or grievance meetings under the collective bargaining agreement.
Gliglione v. Glennon, Civil Action No. 7194 (Worcester Superior Court 5/31/77).
However, this does not preclude negotiations in a public forum if the parties so
agree. City of Attleboro, 3 MLC 1408 (1977). The union may waive its right to
closed meetings but such waiver must be express, knowing and unequivocal. Ayer
School Committee, 4 MLC 1478 (1977). Similarly, it does not mean that the parties
may have no access to the press, unless that privilege is voluntarily foregone or
overriden by statute, so long as the character, timing and quantity of statements to
the press comport with good faith bargaining. Town of Stoneham, 3 MLC 1355
(H.O., 1977). Neither party may require disclosure or the composition of the other
side's bargaining team as a condition precedent to negotiations or coerce the other
party in its choice of a bargaining representative. Southern Worcester County, 2
MLC 1488 (1976).
5) Process of Negotiations
Although the Law does not compel agreement on any issue, neither party can
reject the other's proposals without offering counter-proposals. City of Chelsea, 3
MLC 1048 (H.O., 1977). Nor may a party engage in surface bargaining by rejecting
the other side's proposals and tendering its own without attempting to reconcile the
differences. Town of Saugus, 2 MLC 1480 (1976). The duty is also violated if a party
merely attends a prescribed number of meetings without engaging in meaningful
discussions. Southern Worcester County, 2 MLC 1488 (1976). The Commission has
found bad faith bargaining where an employer, months after negotiations have
begun, offers predictably unacceptable new proposals which violate the parties'
express agreement to limit the scope of bargaining to certain subjects. Lawrence
School Committee and SEIU, Local 310, MUP-546 (1974). Additionally, given a
demand to bargain, the Commission views with disfavor a party's causing long
lapses between negotiating sessions. Middlesex County Commissioners, 3 MLC 1594
(1977).
To insist to the point of impasse on the inclusion in an agreement of a permis-
sive subject of bargaining is a violation of the duty to bargain in good faith. Town
of Andover, 4 MLC 1081 (1977). After an alleged impasse, the duty to bargain is
revived when either party indicates a desire to negotiate in good faith over
previously dead-locked issues. Lawrence School Committee, 3 MLC 1304 (1976).
6) Reducing the Agreement to Writing
Where the parties have reached agreement on all substantive issues, the agree-
ment must be reduced to writing. At this point, neither of the parties is free to
modify the substantive terms or to insist on the addition of new items or the
deletion of agreed upon terms. Blue Hills Regional School Committee, 3 MLC 1613
(1977); Spencer-East brookfield School Committee, 3 MLC 1400 (H.O., 1977). It is
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a refusal to bargain in good faith if the union president signs a memorandum
outlining the terms for an agreement and the union refuses to execute a contract
incorporating those provisions. Belmont School Committee, 4 MLC 1189 (H.O.,
1977), aff'd 4 MLC 1707 (1978).
7) Duty to Support the Agreement
The obligation to bargain in good faith includes the duty to support the agreed
upon proposals. Thus, where a school committee's negotiating subcommittee agrees
to the terms of an agreement, members of the subcommittee must support and vote
for the agreement when a vote on acceptance is taken by the entire committee.
Spencer-East Brookfield Regional School Committee, 3 MLC 1400 (H.O., 1977).
Additionally, the duty to bargain includes the obligation of the employer to support
the contract by submitting to the appropriate legislative body and supporting a
request for an appropriation to fund the cost items of the agreement. City of
Chicopee, 2 MLC 1071 (H.O., 1975); County of Worcester, 1 MLC 1155 (1974); Town of
Franklin, 1 MLC 1026 (1974); Mendes v. City of Taunton, 366 Mass. 109, 315 N.E.2d
865, 871 (19740. Not only must the employer support the contract before the
legislative body, the employer must also take affirmative action to defeat
legislation which would prevent the employer from carrying out the terms of the
agreement. Turner Falls Fire District, 4 MLC 1658 (1977).
Where the chairperson of the Board of Selectmen made a sincere but erroneous
attempt to explain the legal implications of a collective bargaining agreement, the
Commission ruled that such behavior did not indicate insufficient support of the
collective bargaining agreement. Town of North Attleborough, 4 MLC 1585 (1977).
Where the selectmen are silent when confronted with opposition to the
collective bargaining agreement at a town meeting, their silence does not
necessarily indicate insufficient support of the collective bargaining agreement if
the totality of their conduct could have been reasonably interpreted as being
supportive of the agreement. Town of Billerica, MUP-2873, 4 MLC (H.O., 1978).
Newly elected successor public officials cannot be required to indorse publicly the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by their predecessors if such
indorsement involves the exercise of independent judgment. Labor Relations
Commission v. Board of Selectmen of Dracut, SJC, Docket #868, March 14, 1978.
Nothing compels the employer to submit the collective bargaining agreement to
any body but the legislature. Where an advisory board or finance committee is not
the employer's bargaining representative, that body need not support the contract.
Town of Webster, 4 MLC 1543 (1977). Coupled with the statutory duty to request an
appropriation (See Section VII below) is the correlative obligation of an employer
otherwise to facilitate implementation of the agreement. City of Boston School
Committee, 1 MLC 1287 (1975).
8) Unilateral Change
The obligation to bargain in good faith does not cease with the negotiation of an
agreement, but continues during administration of the contract. Ayer School
Committee, 4 MLC 1027 (H.O., 1977) aff'd, 4 MLC 1478 (1977). Town of Andover, 3
MLC 1710 (1977); City of Chelsea, 3 MLC 1169 (H.O., 1976), affd 3 MLC 1384 (1977);
City of Boston, 2 MLC 1331 (1976); Worcester School Committee, 2 MLC 1283 (1976).
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Included in the duty to bargain is the employer's obligation to negotiate before
changing wages, hours, working conditions, or standards of productivity and per-
formance. Lawrence School Committee, 4 MLC 1422 (1977); Town of Wayland, 3
MLC 1724 (1977); Boston School Committee, 3 MLC 1603 (1977); City of Boston, 3
MLC 1450 (1977); Town of North AndoverTTMLC 1103 (1974).
a. ) Notice
The employer must notify the union of potential changes before they are
announced so that the bargaining representative has an opportunity to present
arguments and proposals concerning the proposed alternatives. City of Boston, 3
MLC 1421 (H.O., 1977); City of Chicopee, 2 MLC 1971 (1975). The duty is not
satisfied by presenting the change as a fait accompli and then offering to bargain.
City of Everett, 2 MLC 1471 (1976); City of Cambridge, 4 MLC 1620 (H.O., 1977).
b. ) Elements of Unilateral Change
The elements of a unilateral change are: 1) pre-existing condition of
employment; 2) unilateral alteration; and 3) effect on mandatory subject of
bargaining. (See Scope of Bargaining, Mandatory and Non-Mandatory Subjects,
under Duty to Bargain, Section VI A. above.) Town of North Andover, 1 MLC 1103
(1974). An employer's good faith in unilaterally altering mandatory subjects of
bargaining is irrelevant, as is the fact that the union might not object to the
substance of the change. Town of Wayland, 3 MLC 1724 (1977); Town of Natick, 2
MLC 1086 (1975). The maintenance of the status quo applies not only to contractual
provisions, but also to long-standing customs and practices, City of Boston, 3 MLC
1450 (1977); City of Everett, 2 MLC 1471 (1976); Town of Marblehead, 1 MLC 1140
(1974); City of Cambridge, 4 MLC 1620 (H.O., 1977); Norwood School Committee, 4
MLC 1467 (H.O., 1977). Cf. City of Worcester, 4 MLC 1317 (H.O., 1977) where a
procedure in effect for 1 1/2 years, begun by necessity by new court rules and
rescinded when the court rules dissolved, was not a past practice requiring the
employer to bargain over the change.
Requiring open sessions for grievance procedure is a unilateral change when
past practice has been closed sessions. Ashland Educator's Association, 4 MLC 1251
(H.O., 1977). Where there has been no change in past practice, an employer's
transfer of policemen to other departments, not replacing them with other police-
men or civilians and not substantially increasing workload of remaining employees,
is not a violation, Boston Police Department, 4 MLC 1153 (1977).
In an impasse situation, an employer may implement a unilateral change in a
subject matter under negotiation only if the change is consistent with the bar-
gaining position previously communicated to the union, the employer has not
engaged in any bad faith bargaining, there is no effort to undermine the status of
the union as bargaining agent, and the employers remains willing to fulfill its
bargaining obligations. Blue Hills Regional School District Committee, 3 MLC 1613
(1977); City of Boston, 3 MLC 1450 (1977).
An employer must bargain over the reassignment of non-unit personnel which
has the effect of displacing bargaining unit members. However, it is not a uni-
lateral change to use civilians within the police department in bureaus where there
was a history of the use of civilians and there was no calculated displacement of
unit members. City of Boston Police Department, 4 MLC 1153 (1977); City of
Boston, MUP-2690, 4 MLC (H.O., 1978).
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Mere reiteration of a previously existing policy which has not required strict
enforcement in the past may not constitute a unilateral change. Town of
Arlington, 2 MLC 1266 (H.O., 1975), reversed in part on other grounds, 4 MLC 1296
(1977); City of Worcester, 4 MLC 1317 (H.O., 1977). Also, there was no violation
where an employer attempted to enforce existing rules more effectively and there
was no resulting substantial and significant change in past practice. City of
Leominister, 3 MLC 1579 (1977); nor was there a violation where a mere change in
the mechanics of employee evaluation did not change the standards for evaluation.
City of Worcester, 4 MLC 1317 (H.O., 1977). The introduction of a written employee
evaluation form, without imposition of new standards of performance, is an
acceptable change in supervisory technique. Town of Arlington, 4 MLC 1614 (H.O.,
1977).
c.) Waiver of Right to Bargain
If a union fails to object to a unilateral change in a timely fashion, it may waive
its right to bargain about the matter. City of Lowell, 3 MLC 1001 (1976); Town of
North Andover, 1 MLC 1103 (1974); Revere School Committee, 4 MLC 1187 (1977);
Boston School Committee, 4 MLC 1324 (H.O., 1977). A waiver must, however, be
knowing, conscious, and unequivocal. Melrose School Committee, 3 MLC 1299
(1976). A broad management rights clause is not an effective waiver. City of
Boston, 3 MLC 1450 (1977); Town of North Andover, 1 MLC 1103 (1974); City of
Everett, 2 MLC 1471 (1976). Neither would a "zipper clause" allow a unilateral
change unless the bargaining history of the parties shows that the issue involved in
the change was specifically discussed and appears in the final contract. City of
Cambridge, 4 MLC 1620 (H.O., 1977); Ayer School Committee, 4 MLC 1027 (H.O.
aff'd 4 MLC 1418 (1977).
A union which files a complaint with the Commission after protesting a uni-
lateral change is not deemed to have waived the right to bargain merely because it
failed to formally request bargaining. City of Everett, 2 MLC 1471 (1976).
A formal bargaining request need not be filed if to do so would be futile.
Norwood School Committee, 4 MLC 1467 (H.O., 1977). Nor has the union waived its
right because it failed to remedy the unilateral change in subsequent contract
negotiations, since the union is entitled to bargain on an issue without being pre-
sented with a fait accompli
.
City of Cambridge, 4 MLC 1620 (H.O., 1977). The
filing of a grievance by the union is adequate notice of the union's desire to
negotiate. Lawrence School Committee, 4 MLC 1422 (H.O., 1977).
VII. Collective Bargaining Agreement; Writing Requirement; Terms; Requests
For Appropriations
Section 7(a) of the Law provides that agreements must be reduced to writing
and may not exceed a term of three years. An agreement which automatically
continues beyond three years unless either party proposes to change it does not
violate Section 7. By not proposing changes the parties are, in effect, agreeing to a
new contract. Town of Burlington, 3 MLC 1440 (1977).
Within 30 days after an agreement is executed, the employer is required by
Section 7 of the Law to submit to the appropriate legislative body a request for an
appropriation necessary to fund the contractual cost items. If the legislative body
rejects the request, the cost items shall be returned to the parties for further
bargaining. Town of Franklin, 1 MLC 1026 (1974). Special statutory provisions are
in effect for employers and the Governor when the employer is a board of trustees
of community colleges, state colleges, state universities, the judiciary or the State
Lottery Commission. See Section 7(c) of the Law.
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VIII. Final And Binding Arbitration
A. Threshold Questions
Section 8 of the Law states that parties may include in a written agreement a
grievance procedure culminating in binding arbitration. If there is no binding
grievance arbitration by agreement, it may be ordered by the Commission under
Section 8 of the Law.
When requested to do so by an employer or employee organization, the Commis-
sion may order binding grievance arbitration upon finding two threshold facts.
First, the parties must have executed a written agreement which does not provide
for the resolution of grievances through binding arbitration. Second, there must be
a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the written agreement.
Easthampton School Committee, 4 MLC 1598 (1977); Town of Shrewsbury, 4 MLC
1441 (1977); Town of Wayland, 3 MLC 1367 (1977); Town oTAthoI, 4 MLC 1132 (1977).
In contrast, where the parties have agreed contractually on binding arbitration
of the dispute in question an order under Section 8 of the Law is not appropriate.
Town of East Longmeadow, 3 MLC 1046 (1976). In that case, the party seeking to
enforce the contractual arbitration provision should proceed in Superior Court
pursuant to G.L. Chapter 150C. See Town of Danvers, 1 MLC 1231 (1974).
A Section 8 order is appropriate even though the collective bargaining agree-
ment has expired subsequent to the grievance. Board of Trustees of State Colleges
(Worcester State College), 1 MLC 1474 (1975)1 But where there is no written
contract in effect at the time of the alleged contract breach, a Section 8 order will
not issue. Town of East Longmeadow, 3 MLC 1046 (1976).
If an employee elects to arbitrate a grievance involving suspension, dismissal,
removal or termination, arbitration is the exclusive procedure available to the
employee. Where, however, the grievance does not involve one of those issues, an
employee organization may obtain a Section 8 order even though the aggrieved
employee is pursuing alternative remedies. Board of Trustees of State Colleges
(Worcester State College), 1 MLC 1474 (1975). See also Town of Wayland, 3 MLC
1367 (1977).
When it receives a request for binding arbitration, the Commission does not
itself interpret the collective bargaining agreement. The Commission will order
arbitration so long as the dispute is "arguably arbitrable". Town of Shrewsbury, 4
MLC 1441 (1977); Board of Trustees of State Colleges (Worcester State College), 1
MLC 1474 (1974). Where no arbitrator could reasonably concur with the petitioner's
position, however, the Commission will not order futile arbitration. Sturbridge
School Committee, 1 MLC 1381 (1975).
B. Procedure
Upon receipt of a request for binding arbitration, the Commission notifies all
interested parties. A period of ten days from receipt of the notification is allowed
for an opposing party to set forth in writing any objections to the request. If the
party fails to submit objections and the Commission determines that an order for
binding arbitration should issue, such orders will not provide for a show-cause
hearing. If objections to the request for binding arbitration are timely filed, the
Commission shall determine on a case-by-case basis whether an order for binding
arbitration will issue and, if an order issues, whether it will provide for a show
cause hearing. Board of Trustees of State Colleges (Fitchburg State College), 2
MLC 1344 (1976).
Section 8 proceedings are administrative rather than adjudicatory, and
arguments based on burden of proof are inappropriate. If a Section 8 application is
in proper form and appears regular, the order will issue. Board of Trustees
(Fitchburg State College), 2 MLC 1344 (1976).
C. Refusal to Participate or Comply with Award
Under sections 10(a)(6) and 10(b)(3), it is a prohibited practice for employers or
employee organizations to refuse to participate in good faith in the grievance
procedure agreed to by the parties or arbitration ordered by the Commission. The
continued refusal by a public employer to comply with the procedural grievance
arbitration provisions of a duly executed contract constitutes a per se violation of
its duty to participate in good faith in those procedures. City oT"Chelsea, 3 MLC
1168 (H.O., 1976) aff'd 3 MLC 1384 (1977).
Where an employer refuses to comply with an arbitrator's unambiguous award
and forces other employees to file parallel grievances, the employer violates
Section 10(a)(6) of the Law. The employer may contend in good faith, however, that
the fact situation in the second grievance is not covered by the earlier award. City
of Boston, 2 MLC 1331 (1976).
D. Waiver
An employee organization may, with regard to a specific and narrow class of
disputes, expressly waive its Section 8 right to request binding arbitration.
Worcester School Committee, 2 MLC 1174 (1975). The waiver must be clear and
unmistakable. The absence of a provision for binding arbitration in the collective
bargaining agreement does not constitute a waiver of the right to a Section 8 order.
Town of Athol, 4 MLC 1137 (1977).
The filing of a prohibited practice charge does not in itself signify waiver.
Issues as to whether arbitration has been foreclosed due to procedural deficiencies
in the claim are left to resolution by the arbitrator. Town of Shrewsbury, 4 MLC
1441 (1977).
IX. Impasse Procedures
Section 9 establishes a mechanism for the resolution of bargaining impasses
through mediation, fact-finding, and voluntary interest arbitration. Under sections
10(a)(6) and 10(b)(3), it is a prohibited practice to refuse to participate in good faith
in the statutory impasse procedures. "Last best offer" arbitration for police and
fire fighters is covered by Chapter 347 of the Acts of 1977.
The consistent failure of a party to attend mediation sessions after receiving
timely notice of such meetings constitutes a p_er se violation of the Law. Town of
Rockland, 3 MLC 1359 (H.O., 1977). Entering mediation with the intent to bargain
anew on all items to be negotiated, including those for which previous agreement
existed, is evidence of a lack of good faith. Middlesex County Commissioners, 3
MLC 1594 (1977).
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The withdrawal of an improved offer prior to fact-finding and retreat to a less
favorable position is evidence of bad faith. Town of Saugus, 2 MLC 1480 (1976). In
police and fire fighter cases, insistence on submission to the fact-finder of non-
mandatory subjects of bargaining is, absent consent of the other party, a breach of
the duty to participate in good faith in fact-finding. Local 1099, International
Association of Fire Fighters, 2 MLC 1238 (1975). Egregious misrepresentation of
facts to the fact-finder may constitute a prohibited practice. Factors which may
militate against such a finding include: complexity of the issues; commission of a
similar error by the complaining party; opportunity for rebuttal; and absence of
reliance by the fact-finder upon the misrepresentation. Local 1099, International
Association of Fire Fighters, 2 MLC 1238 (1975).
The fact-finding procedure should be a fluid one inasmuch as it is designed to
encourage settlement. Therefore, mere alteration of proposals during the fact-
finding process is not a prohibited practice. Local 1099, International Association
of Fire Fighters, 2 MLC 1238 (1975). Neither is it a breach of duty to participate in
good faith to release information to the media, at its request, if the release neither
frustrates fact-finding nor contributes significantly to a deadlock of negotiations.
Local 1099, IAFF, 2 MLC 1238 (1975). This assumes, of course, that the parties had
not established ground rules concerning news releases during negotiations. Town of
Maynard, 2 MLC 1141 (H.O., 1975) affd 2 MLC 1281 (1976).
Neither party to an impasse is under an obligation to use the statutory impasse
mechanisms. Should a party decline to use the procedures, however, it cannot
indefinitely refuse to resume negotiations on the ground of impasse. Rather, there
is a duty to resume bargaining when presented with a good faith request to do so.
Lawrence School Committee, 3 MLC 1304 (1976).
IX-A Strikes
Section 9A(a) prohibits public employees and employee organizations from
striking or inducing or encouraging work stoppages by public employees. Under
MLRC Rule 16. when a strike occurs or is about to occur a public employer may
petition for a strike investigation. The employer must also serve a copy of the
petition on an officer or representative of the employee organization and file an
affidavit of service with the Commission. The petition must identify the parties
allegedly in violation of Section 9A(a), and must contain certain other information
needed by the Commission to carry out an investigation. Upon receipt of a proper
petition, the Commission gives notice by telegram or other prompt means to in-
terested parties. Pursuant to this notice, the Commission holds an investigatory
proceeding at its offices. This proceeding is usually held within a day of the filing
of the petition.
While the formal presentation of sworn testimony is often not necessary at the
investigation, the petition must present facts sufficient for the Commission to
conclude that a violation of Section 9A(a) has occurred. Alliance, AFSCME/SEIU,
AFL-CIO, SI-29 (1976). Where material facts are disputed, the Commission agent
may call for sworn testimony. See Taunton Municipal Lighting Plant Commission, 3
MLC 1153 (1976).
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The statute prohibits two types of conduct. First, no public employee or
employee organization shall engage in a strike. See Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts, SI-29 (1976) and the other cases cited herein where public employees refused
to report to work. However, where an existing collective bargaining agreement
specifically authorizes employees to refuse to work overtime, such refusal is not a
strike within the definition of that term in section 1 of the Law. In City of Beverly,
3 MLC 1229 (1976) the Commission found no violation of section 9A(a) when police
officers refused overtime and their collective bargaining agreement specified that
overtime was voluntary and the refused overtime was non-emergency in nature.
Where overtime is required by contract or is emergency in nature, concerted
refusal to work such overtime constitutes a violation of section 9A(a). Town of
Arlington, 3 MLC 1276 (1976); City of Medford, SI-43 (1976).
The second aspect of section 9A(a) prohibits public employees or employee
organizations from inducing, encouraging or condoning a strike. The Commission
has required evidence that the union was participating in the strike. Southeastern
Regional School District, SI-54 (1977).
Recently, however, the Supreme Judicial Court held that union officials have an
affirmative duty to oppose a strike and to insure union compliance with an
injunction. Labor Relations Commission v. BTU Local 66, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2738,
371 N.E. 2d 761. The union's participation in picketing or demonstrations during a
work stoppage is evidence of inducing and encouraging a strike. City of Chelsea,
SI-33 (1976); City of Newton, SI-26 (1976). The union will be held responsible for the
actions of its officers and leaders. Franklin School Committee, SI-56 (1977). The
Commission may infer union inducement and condonation where the work stoppage
was 90 per cent effective, union officers failed to appear for work, and the strike
"started and stopped on cue, clearly indicating organization and direction", all of
which occurred during a period of labor unrest. City of New Bedford, 4 MLC 1001
(1977). Refusals to work in sympathy with other employees engaged in a strike is a
violation of the Law. City of Newton, SI-27 (1976); University of Massachusetts
Medical School, SI-30 (1976^.
If it concludes that a violation of Section 9A(a) has occurred, the Commission
will issue an interim order directing the end of the work stoppage. The
Commission's interim order may also address some of the issues underlying the
work stoppage, especially where related prohibited practice charges are involved,
and require the parties to participate in accelerated bargaining, mediation, or
factfinding. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, SI-29 (1976), (bargaining and
mediation); Southeastern Regional School District, SI-54 (1977), (expedited factfind-
ing). The Commission, in the absence of prohibited labor practices, lacks the
authority to order binding arbitration of the dispute. Director, Division of
Employee Relations v. Labor Relations Commission, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1045, 346
N.E. 2d 852.
X. Prohibited Practices
A. Employer Prohibited Practices
1) Section 10(a)(1) makes it unlawful to interfere with, restrain or coerce an
employee in the exercise of any right under the Law. Since the typical Section
10(a)(1) violation occurs when an employee's rights under Section 2 are infringed, the
reader is referred to the discussion in part II of this Summary. Additionally,
Section 10(a)(1) violations arise in the refusal to bargain context since an employer's
failure to negotiate in good faith interferes with, restrains and coerces employees
in their right to bargain collectively through their chosen representatives. (See part
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VI, above. Surveillance of union activities is sufficient interference to constitute
a violation of Section 10(a)(1). Plymouth County House of Correction, 4 MLC 1555
(1977).
Any action against an employee in retaliation for filing a grievance under the
collective bargaining agreement is a violation of Section 10(a)(1), since the filing of
grievances is a protected union activity. It is no defense to the employer that the
employee's grievance was factually incorrect. City of Worcester, 4 MLC 1684
(H.O., 1977).
2) Section 10(a)(2) makes it a prohibited practice to dominate, interfere or
assist in the formation, existence or administration of any employee organization.
To enter a stipulation with a challenging union that the incumbent's contract would
be continued while the challenger's decertification petition was pending was a
prohibited practice, even when executed in the interest of maintaining labor
stability. City of Worcester, 1 MLC 1265 (1975). An employer was found to be in
violation of Section 10(a)(2) where it refused to bargain over certain subjects with a
union representing one unit of employees, but bargained over the same subjects
with a different union representing another unit of employees. Town of Natick, 2
MLC 1149 (H.O., 1975).
3) Section 10(a)(3) provides that an employer may not discriminate in regard to
hiring, tenure, or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any employee organization. This provision extends to all concerted,
protected activity. Town of Somerset, 3 MLC 1618 (1977). The employer's motiva-
tion is key and an employer's action will be viewed as discriminatory if it is moti-
vated either in whole or in part by an employee's protected activity. Common-
wealth of Massachusetts (Mass. Rehabilitation Commission)
,
2 MLC 1400 (1976);
Ronald J. Murphy, 1 MLC 1271 (1975).
The burden of establishing a violation by a preponderance of the evidence rests
upon the charging party. Town of Dennis, 3 MLC 1014 (1976); Minuteman Regional
School District, 2 MLC 1435 (1976). In order to establish a prima facie case, the
charging party must offer evidence tending to prove the following essential
elements: union or other protected activity; employer knowledge of the activity;
adverse action taken by the employer; employer motivation to penalize or
discourage union activity, Town of Somerset, 3 MLC 1618 (1977); County of
Worcester, 3 MLC 1154 (1976); Town of Tewksbury, 2 MLC 1158 (1975); Town of
Sharon, 2 MLC 1205 (H.O., 1975).
Employer knowledge of union activity may be inferred from the surrounding
circumstances, particularly where the "small plant doctrine" can be applied.
Plymouth County House of Correction and Jail, 4 MLC 1555 (1977).
The burden of establishing improper motivation can be satisfied by circumstan-
tial evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Town of Somerset, 3
MLC 1618 (1977); Town of Sharon, 2 MLC 1205 (H.O., 1975); Harwich School Com -
mittee, 2 MLC 1095 (1975). Factors considered in determining the existence of
improper motivation include: timing of the discharge coincidentally with the
protected activity, Ronald J. Murphy, 1 MLC 1271 (1975); Town of Somerset, 3 MLC
1618 (1977); visibility of the employee in his or her support of the union, Town of
Wareham, 3 MLC 1334 (1976); abruptness of the discharge and the employer's
general hostility toward the union or toward concerted activity, Ronald J. Murphy,
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1 MLC 1271 (1975); Town of Halifax, 1 MLC 1486 (1975); the employer's anti-union
remarks, inconsistent or shifting reasons for the discharge or other discipline, Town
of Hopkinton, 4 MLC 1072 (H.O., 1977), aff'd 4 MLC (1978); St. Elizabeth's
Hospital v. Labor Relations Commission, 321 N.E.2d 837, 1 MLC 1248 (1975); sudden
resurrection of previously condoned transgressions, Town of Hopkinton, 4 MLC 1072
(H.O., 1977), Mt. Wachusett Community College, 1 MLC 1496 1975); stateness of
charges, Town of Somerset, 3 MLC 1618 (1977); surveillance and compilation of
information concerning the employee, Town of Sharon, 2 MLC 1205 (H.O., 1975);
comparative treatment and triviality of reasons for discharge, Town of Hopkinton,
4 MLC 1072 (H.O., 1977) aff'd 4 MLC
_
(1978); Town of Wareham, 3 MLC 1334
(1976); 3 MLC 1334 (1976); departure from established procedures for disciplinary
action, Town of Somerset, 3 MLC 1618 (1977); failure to warn the employee prior to
discharge or other disciplinary action Town of Somerset, 3 MLC 1618(1977); explicit
or inferred hostility and threatening behavior towards employees who have filed
grievances, Department of Public Safety, 4 MLC 1110 (H.O., 1977), see generally
City of Fitchburg, 2 MLC 1123 (1975); Harwich School Committee, 2 MLC 1095
(1975). However, the mere coincidence in time between the employee's union
activities and his or her discharge is not sufficient to raise an inference of
knowledge on the part of the employer of the employee's union activity. Lexington
Taxi Corp., 4 MLC 1677 (1978).
While pro-union concerted activities will not insulate an employee from dis-
charge for "cause", it is well-settled that the existence of "cause" for the
employer's action does not justify it where the preponderence of the evidence
demonstrates that anti-union considerations were involved. Town of Halifax, 1
MLC 1486 (1975); Town of Wareham, 2 MLC 1547 (1976). In the absence of proof of
improper motive the Commission will not question the personnel policies and
practices of a public employer. Town of Tewksbury, 2 MLC 1158 (1975); Danvers
School Committee, 4 MLC 1530 (19771!
The inference that one employee is unlawfully discharged is not necessarily
rebutted by evidence that the employer did not discriminate against another
employee who is also actively engaged in protected activity. Town of Halifax, 1
MLC 1486 (1975). It is not discriminatory for an employer to transfer an employee
to another shift to permit the employee to perform a more skilled job
commensurate with his or her skills. County of Worcester, 3 MLC 1154 (1976).
Termination of employees under a comparative rating system was held to be lawful
even though the employees were active in union affairs, where there was an
absence of discrimination in the rating process. Town of Dennis, 3 MLC 1014 (1976).
A Section 10(a)(3) violation has been found, however, when an employer conditioned
promotion on an employee's non-union status. Town of Swansea, 3 MLC 1484 (1977).
4) Section 10(a)(4) makes it a prohibited practice for a public employer to dis-
charge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he or she has signed
or filed an affidavit, petition or complaint, given testimony under the Law, or
formed, joined or chosen to be represented by an employee organization. City of
Boston, 4 MLC 1033 (1977). In Town of Wareham, 3 MLC 1334 (1976), the Board of
Sewer Commissioners was held to be in violation of Section 10(a)(4) for discharging
one employee upon his stated intention of pursuing redress of his grievances and
another for giving testimony at the Commission.
The Commission considers the protection of Section 10(a)(4) so critical to its
ability to investigate complaints and keep channels of information open that its
protection has been interpreted to extend to employees not defined and covered by
Section 1 as well as those employees covered by Section 1. Michael J. Curley, 4
MLC 1124 (1977).
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5) Section 10(a)(5) provides that it is a prohibited practice for an employer to
refuse to bargain in good faith as required in Section 6. This duty to bargain in
good faith is discussed under Section VI above. Section 10(a)(6) requires that
employers participate in good faith mediation, fact-finding, and arbitration. It is
discussed in Sections VIII and IX above.
B. Union Prohibited Practices
1) Section 10(b)(1), the union counterpart of Section 10(a)(1), makes it a
prohibited practice for an employee organization to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce any employer or employee in the exercise of any right guaranteed under the
Law. Section 10(b)(1), in relation to Section 5, makes it a prohibited practice for a
union to fail to represent the interests of all employees in the bargaining unit
without discrimination and without regard to union membership. See Section V
above; Local 342, International Brotherhood of Police Officers, 2 MLC 1186 (1975).
2) Under Section 10(b)(2) it is a prohibited practice for a union to refuse to
bargain in good faith. See Section VI above; Local 841, International Association of
Firefighters, 3 MLC 1378 (1977); Local 195, Independent Public Employees Associa-
tion, 3 MLC 1587 (H.O., 1977); Town of Andover, 4 MLC 1081 (1977). Where the
Board of Selectmen suggest that the union petition the town meeting for an
increase in insurance benefits, the union did not bargain in bad faith when it
presented its position directly to the town meeting. Town of Leicester, 4 MLC 1264
(H.O., 1977), aff'd 4 MLC 1666 (1977); Leicester Police Association, 4 MLC 1261
(1977).
3) Section 10(b)(3) is the corollary to the Section 10(a)(6) requirement of
good faith participation in mediation, fact-finding, and arbitration. See Sections
VIII and IX above.
XI. Commission Procedures and Remedial Authority
Section 11 of the Law and MLRC Rule 15.00 delineate Commission procedures
and remedial authority in prohibited practice cases. Section 4 of the Law and
MLRC Rule 14.00 govern the procedure in representation cases.
A. Procedures
MLRC Rule 15.02 establishes a six-month statute of limitations on the filing of
prohibited practice charges. A charge must be filed within six months of the
alleged violation or within six months from the date the violation became known or
should have become known to the charging party. Town of Wayland, 3 MLC 1724
(H.O., 1977). Where a violation is continuing, a charge will not be barred because
it is filed more than six months after the initial violation. Local 495, SEIU, 3 MLC
1501 (1977).
1) Charges and Complaints
A charge is the initial written filing a party makes to the Commission. MLRC
Rule 11.07. After investigation, the Commission determines whether a hearing is
warranted and specifies the allegations in a complaint. The allegations in a charge
need not conform to the technical rules of pleading. A charge or complaint is
legally sufficient if it enables the respondent to understand the issues raised so that
it can prepare its defense. Burlington School Committee, 1 MLC 1179 (1974). Where
there are no facts which could support a claim, a hearing is not required and the
Commission has allowed a motion for summary judgment. City of Cambridge, 4
MLC 1044 (1977). A party may not litigate in an unfair labor practice proceeding
issues previously litigated in a representation proceeding between the same parties.
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City of Cambridge, 4 MLC 1055 (1977), nor may a party relitigate representation
issues when it has failed to appeal a hearing officer's decision in a representation
case. City of Worcester, 4 MLC 1373 (1977).
2) Expedited Hearing
Sections 4 and 11 of the Law provide that a hearing may be designated as an
expedited hearing. Designed to relieve the agency's crowded docket, these hearings
are conducted by the Commission members or agents and are recorded by tape
rather than stenographically. The Commission has redesignated an expedited
hearing as a formal hearing upon an uncontested oral motion by a party. Board of
Trustees of University of Massachusetts, 2 MLC 1315 (1976).
The Commission's hearing officers are not bound by the technical rules of
evidence prevailing in the courts. Rulings made by hearing officers during ex-
pedited hearings may not be appealed to the full Commission prior to the
conclusion of the case before the hearing officer. Somerville School Committee, 2
MLC 1335 (1976), except under extraordinary circumstances. See MLRC Rule
13.02(4).
3) Review of Hearing Officer's Decision
A hearing officer's decision becomes final and binding unless a review by the
Commission is requested within ten (10) days. A party who fails to appeal from a
hearing officer's decision cannot raise the same issues between the same parties
without changed circumstances when that issue has been fully and fairly litigated
before the hearing officer. City of Worcester, 4 MLC 1373 (1977). The Commission
has adopted the following procedures for its review of a hearing officer's decision.
The mere filing of a Notice of Appeal of a Hearing Officer's
decision does not entitle the appellant to de novo review of the entire
proceedings. If the appellant claims that errors of law were made by
the Hearing Officer in reaching his or her decision, the timely filing
of an appeal suffices to bring these issues before the Commission.
Supplementary statements containing legal arguments on specific
points will, of course, facilitate the Commission's deliberations and
are always carefully considered.
If the appellant claims that the Hearing Officer erred in fact-
finding, however, it must do more than simply file a general appeal to
the Commission. In the absence of the parties specifically directing
the Commission's attention to alleged incorrect findings of fact, the
Commission will accept the Hearing Officer's fact findings and limit
its review to the Hearing Officer's conclusions of law. Town of
Dedham, 3 MLC 1332 (1976). See also Town of Swansea, 4 MLC 1527
(1977).
The Commission will exercise its discretion to reopen the record only under
extraordinary circumstances. Evidence available to the moving party at the time
of the original hearing has not been admitted upon such a motion. City of Everett,
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2 MLC 1471 (1976). A party's due process rights are not violated because the Com-
mission reviews sound recordings of an Expedited Hearing instead of written
records. The recordings must, however, be sufficiently clear to make the testi-
mony of the witnesses intelligible. Town of Sharon, 3 MLC 1052 (1976).
B. Deferral to Arbitration
When a complaint raises issues that were decided or may be decided through
fair and regular arbitration proceedings agreed to by the parties, and where the
decision is not repugnant to the Law or policy, the Commission will defer to the
arbitrator's decision. The Commission's policy is designed to favor arbitration, and
to discourage forum shopping and relitigation of issues. This deferral policy will be
applied in prohibited practice cases and, where appropriate, in representation
cases. Boston School Committee, 1 MLC 1287 (1975); City of Boston, 1 MLC 1229
(1974); Cohasset School Committee, MUP-419 (6/19/73).
Even though evaluative decisions themselves may be within management's non-
delegable rights, a school committee's failure to follow the procedures for such
evaluation set forth in the collective bargaining agreement has been held to be
subject to arbitral enforcement. School Committee of West Springfield v. Korbut,
1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2548, 369 N.E.2d 1148.
Where both sides submit non-mandatory bargaining subjects to voluntary
interest arbitration, they are bound by the arbitrator's decision which is
enforceable in court. However, where educational policy is involved to a
significant degree, the issue should be excluded from interest arbitration even if
the school committee consents. This determination must be left to a case-by-case
resolution. School Committee of Boston v. B.T.U., Local 66, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh.
2738, 371 N.E.2d 761.
Where arbitration included a decision on a permissive subject and invaded the
legitimate management prerogative on employee assignments, that portion of the
award was severed and voided from the valid part of the arbitrator's decision.
Harpin v. City of Marlborough, Civil Action No. 77-1294, (Middlesex Super. Ct.
8/2/77).
C. Remedial Powers
The Commission has broad powers to order relief if it finds that a prohibited
practice has been committed. It may issue cease and desist orders, and it may
order reinstatement with full back pay, preservation of records necessary to
determine back pay awards, and posting of notices. City of Boston, 1 MLC 1271
(1975).
1) Back Pay Awards
The Commission conducts supplemental proceedings to determine the amount of
back pay due to a discharged employee. Back pay is determined by using the
following formula: Net back pay= gross back pay - (interim earnings - expenses).
In applying this formula, gross pay is to include such items as overtime, bonuses,
vacation pay, holiday pay, retirement benefits, insurance benefits and tips. Interim
-42-
earnings includes only income attributable to new employment. Seven per cent
interest may be added to the back pay award. Plymouth County House of Correc-
tion and Jail, 4 MLC 1555 (1977); Lawrence School Committee, 4 MLC 1422 (H.O.,
1977). The employee's burden is merely to establish gross pay. The employer must
establish interim earnings and other set-offs. The employee must mitigate
damages by seeking suitable employment. Town of Townsend, 1 MLC 1450 (H.O.,
1975). The Commission may estimate back pay when exact computation is not
possible, as long as there is sufficient evidence upon which to base a reasoned
conclusion. The employer waives the right to contest any figures if it does not
appear at the hearing on this matter. Town of Townsend, 1 MLC 1450 (H.O., 1975).
Where an employee was unlawfully discharged one day before he would become
a permanent civil service employee, the Commission ordered the employer to
rehire the employee and grant him immediate status as a permanent employee.
City of Boston, 3 MLC 1101 (1976). The Commission has also ordered the employer
to remove from an unlawfully discharged employee's personnel records any
reference to the discharge. City of Boston, 3 MLC 1101 (1976).
2) Bargaining Orders
In cases where there has been a refusal to bargain by either employers or unions
the Commission ordinarily issues a bargaining order. Where the full consequences
of an employer's refusal to bargain would not be completely remedied by a bar-
gaining order, compensatory relief is appropriate. Middlesex County Commission-
ers, 3 MLC 1594 (1977).
3) Status Quo Ante
Where the Commission finds that the employer has unilaterally altered wages,
hours, terms or conditions of employment, the usual remedy has been to order a
return to the status quo ante, along with a bargaining order. Town of Marblehead, 1
MLC 1140(1974); City of Fitchburg, 2 MLC 1123 (1976). The Commission has also
issued a make whole order directing a city to compensate fire fighters at the rate
of ten per cent of their ordinary wages for the hours they were required to perform
floor patrol under an unlawful unilaterally instituted change in working conditions.
City of Everett, 2 MLC 1471 (1975).
The Commission has ordered an employer to extend to unit employees the
benefits contained in proposals that had been initialed by both negotiators and later
repudiated by the employer when the parties failed to agree upon other items.
Middlesex County Commissioners, 3 MLC 1594 (1977). Similarly, where an employer
violated Section 10(a)(5) by withdrawing a tentative agreement after the union has
already made concessions to reach that agreement, a hearing officer ordered the
employer to return to the bargaining table on the basis of the status quo before the
tentative agreement was withdrawn by the employer. Spencer-East Brookfield
Regional School Committee, 3 MLC 1400 (H.O., 1977). In Boston School Committee,
1 MLC 1287 (1975), the employer was ordered to pay to the union the dues and
agency service fees that normally would have accrued to the union absent the
employer's unlawful refusal to bargain. In an analogous situation, a union was
ordered to return to a unit employee, if she tendered her resignation from the
union, the dues she had paid after she had been unlawfully coerced to join the
union, Local 285, SEIU, 3 MLC 1646 (1977). An employer has been directed to
compensate an employee organization for the union dues which would have been
deducted if unlawfully discharged employees had remained on the payroll.
Plymouth County House of Correction and Jail, 4 MLC 1555 (1977). The employer
was similarly required to reimburse the dischargees for "out of pocket" expenses
incurred during the litigation. Plymouth County, supra.
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4) Other Forms of Relief
Recently, a hearing officer's order of affirmative relief included a requirement
that the mayor introduce an amendment to cure a local ordinance which was the
focus of the employer's bad faith conduct. The Commission affirmed the order,
noting that the remedy did not force the employer to accept any substantive
contract terms, but merely required the mayor to make a proposal before the local
law-making body. City of Springfield, 4 MLC 1134 (H.O., 1977); affd 4 MLC 1517
(1977).
XII. Agency Service Fee
Section 12 of the Law provides that public employees may be charged an agency
fee as a condition of employment if the fee is required by a negotiated collective
bargaining agreement ratified by a vote open to all members of the bargaining unit.
The fee must be proportional to the costs of negotiating and administering the
collective bargaining agreement. The Commission has adopted regulations
requiring financial disclosure by unions charging an agency service fee to non-
members and mandating that notice be given to all employees of votes to ratify
agency fee agreements. Non-members may not be required to defray expenses for
political or charitable contributions; social activities; educational programs
unrelated to collective bargaining; fines or penalties assessed for illegal activities;
organizing costs; or for health insurance, retirement or pension benefits. MLRC
Rules 17.01 to .05. Gloucester Teachers Association, 4 MLC 1548 (H.O., 1977). The
effect of c.903 of the Acts of 1977 (modifying Section 12 of the Law) on the
Commission's Rules has not been determined.
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CHART 1
HOW DID PUBLIC EMPLOYEE BARGAINING EVOLVE?
Wagner Act (National Labor Relations Act)
Gave collective bargaining rights to private sector
employees in interstate commerce.
Massachusetts passes Chapter 150A, "Baby Wagner Act,"
extending bargaining rights to private sector employees
within the commonwealth; Labor Relations Commission
established.
All public employees (except police officers) granted the
right to join unions and to "present proposals" to public
employers. Chapter 149, Section 178D.
Employees of city or town could bargain provided that the
law was accepted by the city or town. There were no specif
procedures for elections nor the matter and method of
bargaining Chapter 40, Section 4C.
State employees given the right to bargain with respect to
working conditions (but not wages). Chapter 149, Section
178F. However, it was not until 1965 when the Director of
Personnel and Standardization promulgated the rules govern-
ing recognition of employee organizations and collective
negotiations that bargaining took place.
Municipal employees given the right to bargain about wages,
hours, and terms and conditions of employment. Chapter 14 9
Sections 178G-N. This repealed Chapter 40, Section 4C.
Mendonca Commission established by legislature to revise
public employee bargaining laws.
All public employees—state and municipal—extended full
bargaining rights under comprehensive new statute, Chapter
150E; binding arbitration of interest disputes involving
police and fire employees.
Chapter 150E amended to strengthen enforcement powers of
Labor Relations Commission; modify union unfair labor
practices; modify standards for exclusion of managerial
employees
.
MLRC issued standards for Appropriate Bargaining Units
affecting fifty five thousand state employees in more than
two thousand job classifications. Ten statewide units were
created - five non-professional and five professional.
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TABLE 2
BREAKDOWN OF TOTAL FILINGS
CODE MEANING 78 77 76
MCR: Petition by or on behalf of Municipal
Employees seeking certification or de-
certification of an Employee Organization, 195 156 194
CR: Petition by or on behalf of Private
Employees seeking certification or de-
certification of an Employee Organization, 24 21 32
SCR: Petition by or on behalf of Employees of
the Commonwealth seeking certification or
decertification of an Employee Organization 12 10 10
MCRE: Municipal Employer seeks to resolve claim of
representation by one or more Employee
Organizations. - - 1
CAS: Employee Organization or Employer seeks
,
clarification or amendment of recognized
or certified bargaining unit. 63 62 64
MUP: Complaint filed by employee organization
against Municipal Employer. 319 256 257
UP: Complaint filed by employee organization
against Private Employer. • 32 32 32
MUPL: Complaint filed by Municipal Employer or
an individual against employee organization. 61 78 48
-UPL: Complaint filed by Private Employer against
employee organization. 6 18
SUP: Complaint filed by employee organization
against the Commonwealth. 84 44 31
SUPL: Complaint filed by the Commonwealth against
an employee organization. 52 15 14
SI: Petition filed by Employer requesting the
Commission to investigate strike or strike
threat by employees. 11 18 24
RBA: Employer or employee organization requests
the Commission to order Binding Arbitration. 9 8 17
TOTAL 868 701 732
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TABLE 4
• TOTAL HEARINGS
FY 78 FY 77 FY 76
Formal 119 114 96
Expedited 263 293 208
Informal 558 648 642
Other 47 35 27
Grand Total 987 1,090 973
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APPENDIX A
Commission decision highlights
1) . November 1977 The Commission ordered reinstatement and back pay
plus 77o interest to four correction officers fired illegally by
the Plymouth County Sheriff in 1975. The officers were fired, the
Commission found, in an attempt to intimidate other employees from
exercising their right to participate in union activities.
2) November 1, 1977 In a decision issued by the Commission concerning
the Lawrence School Committee and the Lawrence School Department
Clerical Employees Association, interest on back pay awards were
increased from 6% to 7%.
3) April 1978 The Commission found that the Commonwealth of Massachusett
committed an unfair labor practice when it made unilateral payroll
deductions from state employees' payroll checks to recoup losses
from an overpayment made by the Group Insurance Commission without
prior bargaining with Alliance, AFSCME-SEIU, AFL-CIO.
A) April 27, 1978 In City of Boston School Committee and Administrative
Guild
,
the Commission issued a decision that dealt with the complex
issue of waiver by inaction.
5) June 2, 1978 The Commission ordered the Newton School Committee to
offer reinstatement and back pay plus 7°/0 interest to seven custodians
who were laid off in July 1976. The Commission ruled that the
School Committee had not bargained sufficiently with the Newton
School Custodians Association over mandatory subjects of bargaining.
Such issues as the criteria for the specific layoffs, recall and
rehire rights, continued seniority, and severance pay were mandatory
subjects of bargaining. The decision was significant because of
the way it dealt with the complex issue of mandatory subjects of
bargaining
.
Higher Court Affirmations of Commission Decisions
1) Cambridge City Hospital house officers (interns, fellows and residents
are defined as employees and therefore covered by G.L.C.150E.
Superior Court concurs
.
2) Supreme Judicial Court affirms Commission interpretation of "manageri;
employee. The Wellesley School Committee refused to bargain with a
group of employees it considered managerial. The Commission, by its
interpretation, found that the employees were not managerial and
found that the School Committee violated G.L.C.150E by refusing to
bargain. The SJC affirmed completely the Commission decision without
reinterpreting or altering in any way the standards the Commission
had used in order to come to its interpretation of "managerial."
3) The Superior Court, in a number of cases, supported the Commission's
contention that decisions resulting from informal conference are
nonappealable
.
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APPENDIX B
Major Elections
December 12, 13, 14 - Faculty in the State College system voted for
representation by Massachusetts Teachers Association. 766 voted for
MTA; 516 for American Federation of Teachers/American Association of
University Professors; no organization 120.
December 8, 9 - Administrative, clerical, and technical employees
at the University of Massachuse-ts , Amherst voted for representation by
the University Staff Association/Massachusetts Teachers Asssociation/
National Education Association. The MTA/NEA beat the incumbent
Massachusetts State Employees Association by a vote of 372 to 33, with
249 voting for no union.
January 20-February 6- Mail in ballot election by probation and court
officers. Local 254 SEIU/AFL-CIO won with 589 votes out of 1151 cast.
The election marked the first time that judicial employees were eligible
to vote for a collective bargaining representative.
March 31 - Chelsea teachers voted for continued representation
by the incumbent Chelsea Teachers Union, Local 1340, AFT, AFL-CIO. AFT
won with 162 votes out of 256 ballots cast. The Massachusetts Teachers
Association lost the election with 90 votes.
April 5 - Nurses employed by the City of Boston, the Depart-
ment of Health and Hospitals at Boston City Hospital, the Long Island
Chronic Disease Hospital, and the Mattapan Chronic Disease Hospital voted
in SEIU, Local 285 over the incumbent Massachusetts Nurses Association.
SEIU received 250 votes out of 484 cast.
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